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1.10.5 Conflict Alerting Tool
The original performance specifications for the ATC radar data processing system (RDPS)
software included provisions for aircraft conflict detection and alerting. During testing in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the RDPS conflict alert function was found to have several faults and was
not considered acceptable for operational use. This function is still not in operational use today.
The Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB), the TSB’s predecessor, recommended in 1990 that,
The Department of Transport accelerate all technical initiatives with a potential for
providing controllers with automated conflict prediction and alerting.
CASB 90-36
Transport Canada accepted the recommendation and advised that “Minimum Safe Altitude
Warning/Conflict Alert would be implemented as the Radar Data Processing Systems are
brought online with the introduction of the Radar Modernization project beginning in June
1990.” In early 1997 NAV CANADA advised that the unavailability of the conflict alert feature of
RDPS was an on-going issue. The conflict alert feature of RDPS was still under development,
and it was hoped that it would be available with the 700 version of RDPS software then
scheduled for release in the fall of 1997. NAV CANADA advised in early 1998 that software
testing of this functionality was under way and on-site test was planned for the fall of 1998.
Operational acceptance was expected to be lengthy. Software testing of the conflict alert
functionality is still under way but is expected to be completed in 1999, followed by site testing
in Toronto, Ontario, and Edmonton, Alberta. The Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW)
portion is not expected to be included in this site test procedure. NAV CANADA, in its
Corporate Safety Plan 1998/99, stated that it is committed to “the national installation of
Minimum Sector Altitude Warning Systems/Conflict Alert (MSAW/CA) on existing surveillance
systems.”
- 8 -
1.11 Flight Recorders
Flight recorder information was provided by Air Canada and Air France to determine aircraft
responses on receipt of the respective TCAS RAs. That information was included in section 1.1
above.
- 9 -
2.0 Analysis
2.1 General
The radar controller was aware, at least from ACA870's radio position reports if not from the
information contained on the flight progress strip, that this aircraft was what is known as a
“cutter”, and that the flight path of the aircraft would cut across the tracks of other aircraft
proceeding eastbound to the ocean. This situation was described as being relatively common for
controllers in southern sectors of the Gander airspace. As well, the radar controller
communicated with ACA870 one minute and twenty seconds prior to the Pan, Pan, Pan call by
the crew. At the time of the communication, the two aircraft were approximately 9 nm apart and
on a converging course. The radar controller should have detected and resolved the conflict
between AFR033 and ACA870 well before the risk of collision occurred.
2.2 Conflict Detection
2.2.1 Information Exchange
Some of the factors which actively contributed to the radar controller not detecting the
approaching conflict include the following:
• There was no strip posted at BANCS for ACA870, and there is no provision for the
automatic printing of such a strip in the flight progress strip processing software in use
in Gander.
• Notwithstanding the direction in Gander ACC Operations Manual, article 4.1.4, that
the sector workplan and the overall strategy shall be determined jointly, there appears
to be no procedure which encourages team planning and problem solving.
• The division of work and the very different work focus of the radar controller and the
data controller encourage independent work. This is acknowledged in the Gander
ACC Operations Manual, article 4.1.4, where controllers are reminded that “It is
recognized that during some traffic situations one controller may not be immediately
aware of all actions initiated by the other ....” The next reminder emphasizing that
“each controller is responsible for his actions” is an accepted philosophy; however, it
contributes little to enhancing safety.
2.2.2 Attentive Flight Monitoring
The TSB investigations noted in section 1.10.4 bear resemblances to this occurrence in that in
each referenced occurrence, the radar controller did not detect aircraft conflicts displayed on the
IM. While strip scanning for potential traffic conflicts is necessary, the increasing prevalence of
direct off-airway routes, which do not lend themselves to the relatively structured environment
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