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AFR033 and ACA870 at the same altitude as they approached BANCS. The radar controller was
primarily responsible for the flow of sector traffic, and other than keeping flight progress strips
updated by checking altitudes and estimates, he performed his separation function using only
the IM. Supervisors, even when not otherwise occupied performing relief duties for other
controllers, are not expected to provide close inspection and quality control of controllers in
these circumstances, because it is not possible for the supervisor to be cognizant of the control
actions taken by controllers in all the sectors of a specialty.
1.10.3 Radar Control Methods
The NAV CANADA ATC MANOPS, article 471.1, directs controllers to apply separation by
consistent reference to, and use of three elements fundamental to effective control: plan
separation, execute the selected plan, and monitor progress to ensure continued applicability of
the plan.
To assist in the identification of potential aircraft conflicts, the radar controller has at his or her
disposal a tool known as the Predict Track Line (PTL). This electronic device displays a line on
the IM showing a predicted direction and expected travel distance of an aircraft present position
symbol based on the time in minutes entered by the controller. It was the radar controller’s habit
to use this tool on a regular basis to detect traffic conflicts. On the night of the occurrence, the
radar controller had used the PTL regularly prior to the approach of the occurrence aircraft, but
did not detect the intersecting flight paths of ACA870 and AFR033.
1.10.4 Radar Monitoring Methods
In TSB Occurrence No. A96A0138, an altered routing put two aircraft that were under radar
control, a Boeing 747 and a Boeing 767 with a total of 502 persons on board, on converging
courses at the same altitude until they were about three miles apart. At that time, the crews of
both aircraft received and reacted to TCAS RAs and manoeuvred to avoid collision. The radar
controller was unable to explain why he was unaware of the conflict between the two aircraft.
In TSB Occurrence No. A97H0007, two aircraft, a Boeing 727 and a Canadair CL-600,
approaching head-on under radar control on direct off-airway routes, were involved in a risk of
collision. In this instance, only one of the aircraft was fitted with TCAS. The RA and subsequent
declaration by the crew of their avoidance action were the only warnings provided.
In TSB Occurrence No. A97C0144, a Boeing 737 under radar control was given permission to
deviate north of the flight planned route to avoid weather. The actual position of the aircraft did
not correspond with that indicated by the positioning of the aircraft’s flight progress strip and
the radar controller, occupied in resolving a problem on another part of the IM, did not detect
the imminent conflict with an opposite-direction DC-9 during his monitoring of the IM. The
Boeing 737 received a TCAS RA and manoeuvred to avoid the other aircraft approaching
head-on.
In TSB Occurrence No. A99H0001 (investigation in progress), two opposite-direction Boeing 767
aircraft under radar control, with a total of 206 persons on board, were involved in an air
proximity occurrence when the radar controller cleared one aircraft to climb through the other’s
altitude. Both aircraft received TCAS RAs.
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In each of the above occurrences, the aircraft were being provided with radar monitoring and
the radar controller had spoken to one of the involved aircraft shortly before the conflict, and in
each instance the radar controllers were unable to explain why they had not detected the
approaching conflict. Controller fatigue or exceptional distractions, other than normal traffic
conflicts, were not identified as findings in any of the completed investigations.
NAV CANADA Functional Goal Number 1 encourages controllers to provide full-time attentive
flight monitoring and flight information services. Effective scanning techniques as required in
ATC MANOPS, article 901.8, are covered in the recently inaugurated Situational Awareness
Module training package, which has been administered to approximately 80 percent of air traffic
control units. Gander controllers had not yet received this training at the time of the occurrence.
There is no formal lesson plan in basic or regional air traffic control training designed to teach
controllers specific radar monitoring techniques or best practices. During basic radar simulation
training, however, instructors are directed to include as teaching points information to avoid
concentrating too long on one situation during radar scanning, because other situations may
require attention as well.
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