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Such analysis is a matter for the body to which the recommendation is addressed
(for example, the relevant regulatory authority in aviation, marine or rail in
consultation with the industry).
– iv –
FACTUAL INFORMATION
Occurrence sequence
At 1200 Eastern Standard Time1 on 26 October 2005, the outboard bead heel of the
number-1 wheel tyre on the left main landing gear (MLG) of an Airbus A340-642
(A340) aircraft, registered HS-TNA, separated from the outboard rim of the wheel
assembly during a landing on runway 16 at Melbourne Airport, Vic. The landing was
conducted during gusting crosswind conditions.
The aircraft was on a scheduled passenger service from Bangkok, Thailand, with a
crew of 20 and 253 passengers on board. The copilot was the handling pilot for the
flight. There were no reported injuries to any of the aircraft occupants.
The number-1 wheel tyre (figure 1) deflated immediately after the bead heel
separated from the wheel rim. The tyre then partially disintegrated during the
remainder of the landing roll, and the tyre tread detached from the tyre casing (see
Appendix A).
Following the number-1 wheel tyre deflation, the crew maintained control of the
aircraft and, apart from some minor deviations, tracked along the centreline (see
Appendix B).
Figure 1: Number-1 wheel tyre
1 The 24-hour clock is used in this report to describe the local time of day, Eastern Standard Time
(EST), as particular events occurred. Eastern Standard Time was Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC) + 10 hours.
– 1 –
Damage to the aircraft
Contact with the runway surface scored and scratched the outboard rim of the
number-1 wheel assembly after the tyre deflated (figure 2).
Figure 2: Damaged number-1 wheel assembly
Fragments of rubber that dislodged from the disintegrating tyre impacted the
underside of the left wing and the left underside of the fuselage near the left MLG
and resulted in some minor skin damage. Rubber fragments also broke off a small
portion of the left MLG fairing door, and dislodged a small inspection panel on the
inboard side of the number-2 engine pylon.
The disintegrating tyre also damaged a hydraulic brake line on the left MLG. The
heat from the left MLG wheel-brake assemblies ignited hydraulic fluid which leaked
from the damaged brake line. The airport rescue and fire fighting service (RFFS)
rapidly extinguished the fire.
Other damage
The number-1 wheel rim damaged the surface of runway 16 after the tyre separated
from the wheel rim (figure 3). Appendix B depicts the extent of the markings and
gouging to the surface of runway 16/34 as a result of the occurrence.
– 2 –
– 3 –
Figure 3: Markings and damage to the surface of runway 16
Personnel information
Flight crew
The flight deck crew was an augmented crew consisting of the pilot in command and
three copilots.
The pilot in command held an appropriate flight crew licence, was type-rated on
A340 aircraft, held a current medical certificate, and had 18,013 hours total flight
experience. Of that experience, 17,913 hours were on multi-engine aircraft types, and
630 hours were on the A340 aircraft.
The handling copilot also held an appropriate flight crew licence, was type-rated on
A340 aircraft, held a current medical certificate, and had 3,547 hours total flight
experience, of which 3,355 hours were on multi-engine aircraft, and 43 hours were
on A340 aircraft. Before commencing operations on the A340, the handling copilot
had been operating as a copilot on Airbus A330 aircraft.
Both handling crew members reported having taken a period of inflight rest during
the flight from Bangkok to Melbourne. Following that rest period, both handling
crew members had been at the controls for 3 hours and 15 minutes at the time of the
occurrence.
Air traffic services
Airservices Australia reported that all air traffic services (ATS) controllers involved
in the control of the aircraft as it approached Melbourne Airport were licensed and
rated for the relevant controller positions. The controller acting as the Melbourne
Flow Controller was not endorsed to operate in that position, but was under the
supervision of an appropriately-endorsed flow controller at the time.
Airservices Australia reported it had identified no unusual work conditions or
distractions within the ATS environment that may have contributed to the incident.
Also, none of the controllers reported having been fatigued while they were involved
in managing the aircraft’s approach to Melbourne.
The investigation concluded that the licensing, qualifications and experience of the
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