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Response times rarely exceed one second, regardless of the amount of
temporal or event uncertainty that the pilot might confront.]
e. Movement time
[A pilot’s skilled response can be divided into two phases: The first
involves the pilot’s preparation for a response (response time), while
the second involves the actual movement time necessary to execute the
response. Movement time and response time are controlled by
separate aspects of the task at hand. First, the amplitude of the
SEPARATION SAFETY MODELING
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movement and the requirements for accuracy interact in determining
the speed of movement. Secondly, if feedback information is needed to
monitor the movement, it will reduce the speed of movement.
Nevertheless, feedback (e.g., visual, kinesthetic) provides for the
processing and correction of subsequent responses during ongoing
performance. In short, movement time is governed by the total amount
of information that a pilot has to process.]
f. Crew workload and vigilance
[Underlying the effects of workload on performance is the need to
handle several sources of information concurrently and the ability to
alternate between these sources of information (i.e., time-sharing).
The effects of workload on performance can be accounted for
reasonably well by assuming that one can perform a task best when
one is somewhere between very low and very high periods of activity.
In other words, there is some optimum level of workload for an
individual to achieve maximum performance, and both greater and
lower levels of workload will impede this performance. Too low a
level of workload can result in a loss of vigilance, while too high a
level will result in narrowing attention to the more central or
frequently occurring signals and neglecting less probable sources of
information. In the inflight environment, this is equivalent to
restricting one’s focus to a single aspect of a problem or event at the
expense of maintaining a more comprehensive internal representation
or “picture” of the situation inside and outside the flight deck. In
each case, what is lost is the ability of the pilot or crew to look ahead
or prepare for what could come next. This becomes more critical in
high density or complex traffic.]
g. Human error/human reliability
[Pilot errors or blunders are generally symptomatic of underlying
mismatches between the pilot and the larger system in which the error
occurred. The growing complexity on the flight deck and the current
environment of “increasing efficiency” may be creating more
opportunities for mismatches. For example, the increasing demands
for greater capacity and efficiency in ATC will increase pressure on
the pilot. In other words, the envelope of safe functioning may be
reduced due to external demands, thereby increasing the potential for
blunders. As another example, technological advances in the flight
deck could lead to a reduction in perceived risk and hence to
performance that is closer to the minimum acceptable limits, thereby
effectively reducing the margin of safety. Alternately, increased
automation leads to relying on different sets of skills, creating the
potential for new kinds of errors (or blunders) and system failures.
Accordingly, we need to consider how different technologies can either
mitigate or increase susceptibility to incorrect or erroneous actions by
APPENDIX A
FACTORS POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SEPARATION SAFETY
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a flight crew. In short, we need to design technologies that assume the
existence of error.]
h. Interaction with hardware/software automation/assistance
i. Displays
[The ability of a display to reduce complexity is measured in
terms of how effective it is in providing a meaningful and coherent
picture of the traffic situation to the pilot. On the other hand, the
need to improve readability, to use or not use color, and to reduce
information clutter are more commonly cited issues by display
engineers. However, the extent to which a display succeeds is not
based on how little or how much information there is, but on how
effectively it is arranged and integrated. Displays must be able to
manipulate the data so that the resulting organization is
(immediately) meaningful with respect to the problem solving tasks
confronting the pilot.]
ii. Warnings/advisories
[The use of flight deck systems that display nearby traffic and
communicate warnings directly to the pilot of impending conflicts
and collisions may enhance safety under reduced separation
minima. However, experience with existing technologies, such as
TCAS II, confirms pilot aversion to false warnings, and, hence, the
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a concept paper for separation safety modeling(64)
