5. Loss of situational awareness.
6. Poor CRM. In particular, junior crew not speaking up or cautioning the senior about his concerns or the senior crew ignoring and not utilising the full potential of the junior crew member. Both these can be avoided by cultivating a very conducive work environment in the flight deck where both pilots irrespective of their position, seniority or rank in the company, work as a team.
Having discussed some of the causes of CFIT, it is necessary to bring into practice some procedures, which may reduce the risk of CFIT.
1. Safety Altitudes (SA): Since most radar controlling for the approach usually commences around 50NM from the airport, it is important to note the SA upto 50 NM around the airport. The controller may turn the aircraft left and right to avoid other aircraft, for spacing, or the pilot may request changes in track to avoid weather. Though controllers are cautioned against this, occasionally in a high density environment it is possible that a controller after making an aircraft descend within 25 NM of the airfield may again take the aircraft beyond 25 NM at the same lower altitude during radar vectors. In these cases the pilots must always be aware of their relative position and the ground below them and the SA. If in any doubt ask / remind the controller who may be preoccupied with other aircraft.
The MSA given in the approach chart is upto 25 NM from the airport or a DME mentioned. To get the SA beyond 25 NM the STAR / SID / Area chart must be studied and the applicable (MORA, MOCA, FPL Safety Height) SA noted. The first officer must note down for the route during descent, the SA from 50 NM to 25 NM and the MSA within 25NM on the landing data card. Every time the aircraft is cleared to a lower altitude during the descent the PNF should include MSA as a standard callout as follows:
"Cleared to FL 70 above MSA/SA, which is 6500"
This will serve as a constant reminder of SA and increase situational awareness. During descent and approach atleast one pilot ND must be kept on map mode to get the correct orientation.
On a number of occasions particularly at African airports and sometimes at Indian airports too pilots reported no indication in the NOTAM and even the ATIS indicated an ILS approach and yet at between 25 to 40 mts from the Airport, the approach controller reported "ILS out of service, report over VOR for a VOR/DME approach" To prevent surprises of this nature and to be prepared for this eventuality, the following method should be followed :
1) Both Precision and Non-precision approaches should be studied.
2) First Officer should make a table of DME vis-a-vis Altitude similar to the one found on localizer approaches / Glide slope out approaches on ILS charts upto a distance of 12 NM from touch down. While making this the VOR DME approach chart must be checked to ensure any mandatory or minimum Altitude to be adhered to. If the chart has DME/ALT checks, follow them. At most airports, the MDA and visibility for non-precision approaches are calculated so that by the MDA, the runway approach lights atleast must be visible. If not, a level segment is flown upto the visual descent point (VDP) and then a landing/missed approach carried out as appropriate. A Go Around maybe initiated before the MAP, but turns must only be initiated after passing the MAP. Incase of close proximity to the VOR/NDB allowance must be given for the radius of turn and a good orientation maintained to avoid ‘going around in circles’. 中国航空网 www.aero.cn 航空翻译 www.aviation.cn 本文链接地址：Airbus ABNORMAL/EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 空客非正常/紧急程序(28)
