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to buy from China for political or cost reasons rather than because of the capabilities of the satellites offered. And as a result of the failure of two of four examples of the DFH-4 platform on which these satellites were based, increased insurance premiums on future purchases of this type may erase much of the cost advantage. Nonetheless, Nigeria has reportedly ordered three more satellites based on the DFH-4 platform (“NigComSat,” 2010). If these satellites are successfully launched and operated in the next few years, China’s ability to sell such satellites to other countries may improve.
In the area of commercial imagery, China is not known to have offered for sale the high-resolution imagery provided by CBERS 2B or its Ziyuan or Yaogan series of imagery satellites. This may in part be to avoid revealing the capabilities of those satellites, but the Chinese government also does not accept the legitimacy of the satellites of other countries collecting intelligence information on China from space, and it claims that its own satellites do not image the territory of other countries (conversation with Chinese space official, April 2008). Thus, China might have difficulty offering satellite imagery for sale without contradicting its own government’s position. In any case, given that higher-resolution commercial imagery is already available from other sources, China’s satellites might have difficulty competing in the com-mercial imagery market.
Finally, once the Compass constellation of PNT satellites is com-plete, around 2020, it is possible that China could offer access to its high-precision signal on a subscription basis. Given that the public GPS signal is freely available, however, it is not clear how many individuals or organizations would be willing to pay for a higher-precision signal.
Thus, China’s strongest and most marketable space capability probably remains its space launch capability. As noted earlier in this chapter, China’s space-lift vehicles, although not as powerful as those of the United States, the ESA, or Russia, have compiled a remarkable record of success since 1996. However, because of restrictions the United States imposed in the late 1990s on China’s launching of satellites with
U.S.
technology content, since 1998 only three of those launches have been for foreign customers, and two of those were of NigComSat and Venesat, Chinese-made satellites. Palapa D1, launched in August 2009
for an Indonesian company, however, was built by Thales Alenia Space without using American components and thus was not subject to U.S. export restrictions (“Palapa Series,” 2010). It might represent the lead-ing edge of a new wave of launches of commercial satellites without
U.S.
technology content, except that, ironically, the launch of Palapa D1 is the one known failure of a Chinese launch vehicle in the past 14 years. Whether Chinese launch vehicles will become popular again for contract launches remains to be seen.
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：Ready for Takeoff China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry(72)
