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Airbus, itself, was predicated on the distribution of design and manufacturing efforts across companies from the four original national partners: France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain (Morrison, 2010). Historically, national carriers in the same four countries purchased pri-marily Airbus planes, but aviation deregulation and low-cost carriers have diversified the EU market for large commercial aircraft. Further, work or technology distribution is difficult for Airbus, as it has to bal-ance that with the interests of the four major partner nations (Karp, 2007).
Recognizing that its aerospace industry is not yet capable of designing and producing large commercial aircraft that are competi-tive with modern Airbus and Boeing products, China’s government has allowed its airlines to import such aircraft since the 1980s. How-ever, the Chinese government has also used the purchase of large commercial aircraft to pursue other goals. In the past, for example, the Chinese government has suggested that large orders for Boeing planes hinged on the renewal of Most Favored Nation trading status (Newhouse, 2007, pp. 182–183). More recently, Beijing has suggested that Boeing’s success in China may be jeopardized by political friction over Taiwan (Heim, 2005). In addition, China’s central government, with hopes of modernizing its aerospace industry, has attempted to leverage large commercial aircraft purchases in exchange for arrange-ments that it hopes will lead to technology transfer. Tempting air-plane manufacturers with the huge potential market in China, the Chinese government has encouraged producers of large commercial aircraft to establish manufacturing and assembly joint ventures with state-owned aerospace corporations. Often, this has taken the form of domestic assembly or subcomponent production, e.g., the McDonnell Douglas MD-80/90 assembly agreements and past Boeing component contracts. The technology transfer associated with these arrangements, however, was limited to manufacturing and production methods. The same is true of the much-touted Airbus final assembly line recently opened in Tianjin. According to industry reports, all major parts are manufactured at Airbus’s plant in Hamburg and shipped to Tianjin only for final assembly (Francis, 2008).
Since the late 1990s, therefore, the Chinese government has encouraged joint ventures with the hope of increasing technology transfer. These policies have been only partially successful, however. Most of the aviation joint ventures established in China have involved older systems and still consist primarily of assembly operations. Key technologies and components such as engines or avionics are manufac-tured in the West and imported into China for assembly. It should also be pointed out that while technology transfers of this type do help to elevate China’s commercial aerospace capabilities from a very low base, their direct impact on Chinese military capabilities is even more lim-ited, as the most critical military aerospace technologies are unlikely to be transferred via commercial avenues. Stealth, for instance, is not directly relevant to commercial aviation, and the same is true for sensor fusion and networking multiple aircraft. Basic engine technology is common to both commercial and military aircraft, but design goals for affordable, highly efficient commercial turbofans are quite different from those for high-performance military engines.
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航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
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Ready for Takeoff China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry(27)
