曝光台 注意防骗
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dropped it on the center console. Very little water spilled
and we immediately cleaned it up. A few minutes later, the
cabin altitude began to fluctuate—climbing and
descending. We initiated a descent to below 10,000 feet.
While descending, the passenger oxygen masks deployed.
The flight continued to our destination without incident.
Even though everything turned out all right, it can never be
emphasized enough: be very cautious
with liquids around electronic
components.
The Big Sky
A recent ASRS report reminds us that
the “big sky” isn’t as big as we may think.
A parachute-jump plane pilot explains in an
ASRS report:
n After takeoff, I told Center that we were 4-1/2
minutes until jumpers away, and I confirmed that there
was no traffic in the area. At 12,000 feet, I made an
announcement on CTAF that jumpers would be
jumping in two minutes. At one minute away from
jumpers exiting the aircraft, a spotter checked one last
time for hazardous traffic. I made one final
announcement on CTAF that jumping would be in
progress for the next 10 minutes.
After landing, I was told that an aircraft hit a
skydiver’s open canopy at about 2,000 feet, just seconds
after the chute deployed. The most outboard cell of the
chute had a one-foot tear in it, confirming the event.
The skydiver was not hurt, nor was the chute damaged
enough for a cutaway.
The pilot of the other aircraft knew he was near the
drop zone. He also heard the two-minute call on the
CTAF, but continued flying circles near the area. It is
possible that he was distracted while circling and
sightseeing.
The pilot of the other aircraft was legal to be occupying
the airspace at the same time as the jumpers.
However, careful see-and-avoid practice by the pilot
might have prevented this near-tragedy.
Unpronounceable computer-generated navaid fix names
SF340 cargo fire detection system false alarms above FL180
In the September CALLBACK, we published summaries
of two research papers presented by ASRS at The Ohio
State University Ninth International Aviation Psychology
Symposium. One of these discussed communicationsrelated
difficulties that occur during general aviation
dual flight instruction. Some of these problems included
failure to comply with ATC clearances, poor radio
technique, and confusing or misleading intra-cockpit
communications. Below are three incident reports
relevant to these issues. First, an instructor confesses to
being a little too wrapped up in the instruction mode.
n My student and I were practicing takeoffs and
landings. We had started flying using headsets, with the
radios being monitored through the headsets. After the
first landing, my student stated that he would prefer to
continue the flight without the use of the headsets. I said
OK, and we both took our headsets off. At this time, I
failed to ensure that the radios were being monitored on
the overhead speaker in the cockpit. We got involved in the
lesson, doing approximately five touch-and-goes, and I
failed to notice that we had not heard from the Tower
during this time. When I did notice the speaker button
was not in the proper position, I immediately pushed the
button and made contact with the Tower. They
terminated the flight and I was instructed to telephone the
Tower as soon as possible. The Tower Supervisor made
me aware of the impact of my error.
In another radio-related report, an introduction to
instrument training turned into a lesson in priorities and
cockpit discipline. A private pilot reports:
n After a briefing on the ground, we took off. Runway 35
was in use; we were to fly the ILS 17 approach. I was
wearing a hood, and the CFI was coaching me through the
turns and timing. Intercom between headsets was in use.
At some point, the CFI turned down the radio volume
because traffic between Tower and other aircraft was
conflicting with his instructions. I removed the hood at
Decision Height, noted a flashing red light signal from the
Tower cab, and immediately initiated a missed approach.
My first thought was that the Tower had lost their radio.
Then I was shocked to see our radio volume turned down.
The CFI admitted that he had forgotten to turn it back up.
Thankfully, there was no departing traffic to create a
head-on conflict. In both these incidents, the instructors
allowed the intra-cockpit communications of the
teaching situation to take precedence
over communications with ATC.
What a private pilot refers to as “wishy-washy
communications” led to lack of a
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