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时间:2010-07-02 13:12来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:admin
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incorrect idea that permission is required… Help!
In the words of the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM):
AIM, Section 3, 4-3-2(a). “…It is a good operating
practice to remain on the Tower frequency for the
purpose of receiving traffic information. In the interest
of reducing Tower frequency congestion, pilots are
reminded that it is not necessary to request permission
to leave the Tower frequency once outside of Class B,
Class C, and Class D surface areas…”
AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL/FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS
“Culture Shocks” in Communications
U.S. flight crews must exercise extra vigilance when
operating internationally into airports where accented
English, and the use of native languages by air traffic
controllers, can create confusion and uncertainty about
ATC instructions. A recent ASRS report describes how an
alert flight crew relied on “gut instincts” and prior
experience to avoid a ground collision:
We begin with the First Officer’s concise account:
 We were cleared for an immediate departure on
Runway 09L, but we had to do a low-speed abort because
the prior aircraft that landed took an excessively long time
to clear the runway. We also had a hard time clarifying our
clearance because Tower was having a long conversation in
[non-English language]. When we were finally able to
inform them of our actions, they told us to taxi clear of the
runway and to contact Ground. We elected to stop
immediately after leaving Runway 09L because taxiing well
clear of Runway 09L would have placed us on [a] taxiway
which also doubles as Runway 09R. We wanted to make
sure that it was safe to proceed any further. [It is] fortunate
we did because Tower had cleared another aircraft to land
on Runway 09R/taxiway and following their instructions
could have resulted in a collision.
The Captain’s report ( ) added this clarifying
information
  …To clear Runway 09L conservatively would take us
on to taxiway/Runway 09R. Taxiway/Runway 09R had not
been used as a runway since we had been in the vicinity
[but]…I decided to stay on Tower frequency – wait and look
first – aware that our tail might be in close proximity to
Runway 09L. We felt that due to the limited English
speaking capability of the controller, it would be unlikely
that we could get any kind of clarification from him. Also,
at the time he was blocking the channel with some lengthy
[non-English] dialog. Unknown to me, perhaps because all
this occurred on the radio in [another language], the
aircraft in close landing proximity now off to our right and
slightly behind had been recleared. At about the time the
aircraft touched down [on Runway 09R] right in front of
us, the Tower controller told us to hold short of Runway
09R. Yet he had previously handed us off to Ground…
Even this crew’s commendable caution could not avoid a
ground conflict with the landing aircraft on the parallel
runway.
Troubles Come in 3’s
A recent report from a Captain (the Pilot Not Flying in the
incident reported) describes another kind of culture shock –
the communications mix-ups that can occur when
experienced pilots are paired with newer flight deck crew:
 Approaching [destination airport] from the east we were
cleared to 1l,000 feet/250 knots. We checked in with Approach
at 11,000 feet with the ATIS information. When Approach
acknowledged our check they issued a new altimeter setting of
30.00. We acknowledged the updated information. As I reset
the two altimeters on the Captain’s side, I inadvertently said
3000 (3 thousand), referring to the altimeter setting rather
than a more appropriate verbiage of 30.00 (three zero zero
zero). No other conversation was ongoing at the time. We
were both monitoring Approach Control and at the time I
thought my meaning was clear. Several moments later I
noticed we were descending out of 11,000 feet and 3,000 was
set in the altitude window. We began a climb back to 11,000
as I reconfirmed our assigned altitude…
After landing we discussed the incident further and how a
similar situation might be avoided in the future. The First
Officer is relatively new – a month or two with the airline. I
learned that he had misinterpreted my verbalization of the
altimeter setting as a newly assigned altitude and thought
when I restated it that I wanted him to reset the altitude select
window… I explained that…I would be more precise in the
future. We also used this event as a basis for discussing why,
 
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