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✈ Inaccurate load manifests
✈ Unsafe handling of hazmat
The following report excerpts illustrate the range of
problems identified.
Undeclared Hazmat
Upon arriving, it was discovered that a battery had
been loaded onto my aircraft. The labeling of the battery
indicated that it was a 12-volt automotive battery. The
battery was tagged as a piece of checked baggage. The
battery was not in a battery box nor was it carried as part
of a wheelchair. Further, no mention of the battery was
made on the [load] manifest. At no time prior to arriving
was the crew made aware that we were carrying this
hazmat. The owner of the battery was not even on my
flight. The owner had actually arrived at [destination
airport] the day before and made a claim for the lost
battery. On the claim itself he described his lost bag as a
“boat battery”! From the ticket agent to all the rampers
who handled the battery, I’m stunned that nobody refused
this shipment.
Illegible Load Manifests
A DC-10 flight crew returned to their airport of origin
when the source of a strong odor could not be identified
inflight. After the aircraft was met by the rescue squad,
the crew secured and exited the aircraft. But their
problems were only beginning…
Even though the yellow pouch that contained the
hazmat paperwork was presented to the rescue squad, the
illegibility of some of the individual 5-part forms failed to
satisfy their requirements due to a lack of specificity. We
were quarantined at the aircraft for an extended period of
time, arriving at the hospital approximately 4 hours after
egress.…
Lessons learned: Specialists who prepare load manifests
need to make hazmat paperwork legible, and flight crews
need to review this paperwork for legibility and content
prior to flight.
Inaccurate Load Manifests
A B757 Captain reported another aircraft diversion
incident to the ASRS due to an equipment overheat
indication. Once the aircraft was safely on the ground,
the flight crew made a chilling discovery:
…On arrival at our gate, our forward cargo
compartment was found to be “frozen.” Our hazmat slip
indicated we had dry ice on board. We had 21 pieces each
weighing 22 lbs. We thought they meant 2.2 lb., as that is
the lb. weight of a kilogram. This was interpreted as 46.2
lb…which is far less than the authorized 440 lbs. that our
B757’s are allowed to carry. Our hazmat slip should have
indicated either kilograms or liters, but we assumed the 22
lb. weight to be a courtesy conversion of a kilogram to lbs.
by our cargo personnel. Our assumption was wrong, and
should have prompted an inquiry as to the exact weight of
the dry ice. In the future, I will assume nothing… I also
believe that a visual confirmation of the cargo is a good
idea…
Unsafe Handling of Hazmat
FAA Inspector found 1 of 3 hazmat boxes that were
ready to load onboard had a puncture. He advised the
Crew Chief of the damage. I advised the Crew Chief that
he should at least tape the hole. At departure time the FAA
inspector went back downstairs and observed that the box
had been taped in violation of FARs and [said he] intended
to issue a violation… I apologized to the inspector for
asking that the Crew Chief tape the box. He said that the
Crew Chief should have known better and that the box
needed repackaging. A second violation will be
forthcoming, according to the FAA inspector, for the way
the 3 boxes were placed in the forward cargo compartment.
Evidently they were not secured with ropes until [the
inspector] asked the Crew Chief…
Transportation of dangerous goods by air requires
proper packaging and rigorous adherence to safety
requirements, especially in these times of heightened
national security awareness.
Number 268 December 2001
ASRS Launches Aviation Security Study
Following the terrorist attacks of Cockpit/cabin security issues. These
September 11th, ASRS has received an incidents concern issues of access to the
increasing number of reports detailing cockpit by flight crews and other
airport and aircraft security concerns. authorized personnel, as illustrated by
Beginning in December 2001, ASRS will another Captain’s report:
conduct a 3-month study of the security- Entering the jetway to prepare for
related reports received. flight, a man in the line of passengers told
The ASRS security study will be based in me that he “worked for the FAA and
part on “structured callbacks” (telephone wanted to ride on the jump seat.” He
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