曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
resident to turn on their fuel pump…There was no decimal on
the gauge, no obvious 1/10-gallon indicator numerals. My CFII
pumped fuel into…one tank until the fuel pump indictor read “6”
and into the second tank until the indicator read “12.”
While preflighting the helicopter again, we noticed that the
fuel gauge still indicated zero. Because the gauge had
historically intermittently indicated zero instead of the actual
fuel state and because we thought we had just on-loaded 12
gallons of fuel, we disbelieved the fuel gauge, took off, and
flew on to our destination. I was hover-taxiing back to the
ramp when the engine sputtered and quit, requiring an
unplanned emergency landing from a three-foot hover.
The fuel tanks were found to be completely dry, after a flight
of only a few miles. Postflight checking of the tanks, fuel boost
pumps, and lines revealed no leaks. I believe that we on-loaded
only 1.2 gallons of fuel—not 12 gallons as we had thought.
We should have taken the time to “dip-stick” the fuel tanks to
be completely certain about the amount of fuel on-loaded.
The reporter paid the airfield resident $20, making that a very
expensive gallon of fuel. Still, as the reporter concludes, That
was one of the best buys I’ve ever made, since it allowed us to fly
back to our airport before the engine quit on the ramp—rather
than in the air, requiring a real autorotation to the ground.
Another GA pilot also made a precautionary landing when
the fuel gauge did not jibe with the planned fuel burn.
n I gave the FBO instructions to fill both fuel tanks to 1/2 inch
below the filler neck. I returned four days later, preflighted the
aircraft, and looked in both fuel tanks—the level seemed
lower than I had requested but not so low that I was suspicious.
I departed…and noticed the fuel consumption was more than
normal. The right tank ran dry soon after I changed over to
it. I advised Center I was going to divert…but I became
concerned that I might run out of fuel, so I chose a good looking
pasture and made a precautionary landing. I called a [nearby
FBO] for fuel. A farmer mowed a strip for me, and I took off and
flew the 5 miles to [my diversion airport]. I have a billing
account at the departure airport, so no fuel receipt was given to
me, and my visual inspection did not clue me in to the fact that I
had not been fueled. I should have used a measuring stick in the
tanks.
Visual inspection of tanks, dipstick measurements, fueling
receipts (when available), and fuel gauge readings should
all concur. If any one is out of synch with the others, the
situation warrants a manual fuel check to verify actual fuel
status.
Multiple Misses
Next, an air cargo crew missed multiple preflight cues that
their fuel state was not as it should be. In portions of the
report not cited here, the Captain lists schedule pressure,
crew fatigue, and lack of currency as causes of this incident:
n During takeoff, the airplane began to yaw and dip to the left.
The takeoff was rejected. While taxiing back, we discovered
that the main fuel tank was virtually empty, thus starving the
#1 engine of fuel. Apparently the engine flamed out during
takeoff, then relit during the rejected takeoff. Further
investigation found a fuel valve open which had allowed the
main tank to pump itself empty into another tank. Both the
Captain and Second Officer missed seeing the low fuel tank
quantity, the fuel transfer light, the low fuel tank warning
light, and the fuel fill valve switch in the wrong position.
As the reporter of another fuel mismanagement incident
summed up: Any fuel situation is potentially dangerous, no
matter how benign it may appear. As I learned many years
ago, fuel in the fuel truck is of little use to a pilot in the air.
Nesting Habits
In the past, we have shared reports about insect nests
found in fuel tank vents and pitot tubes. Here is a
report of a new location for those pesky and persistent
little wasps known as mud daubers, or dirt daubers.
The First Officer of a B-727 cargo flight tells the tale:
n Preflight, start, and taxi were normal. Setting power for
takeoff, the Captain announced that the #1 and #3 throttles
felt misaligned with #2. The decision was made to continue
takeoff. Takeoff roll was longer than normal for this weight.
Airborne, the Captain and Flight Engineer analyzed the
engines and determined that the EPR’s [Engine Pressure
Ratios] were extremely high on the #1 and #3 engines for the
corresponding [engine instrument] readings. The decision
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