曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
crews commonly refer to as a “crotch strap” – a part of the
seat harness that passes between the legs and snaps into the
seatbelt portion of the harness. This same type of restraint
is called a “submarine strap” in car racing because it keeps
the driver’s body from “submarining” under the panel during
a crash. Here’s what happened:
Flight departed block late followed by normal Before
Takeoff checklist…[This included] elevator control tab check
by both Captain and First Officer simultaneously full aft, then
full forward, while confirming associated movement of
elevator... This was accomplished. No abnormalities noted.
As takeoff was initiated Captain called “80 knots.” I
accomplished “elevator checks” but noted a somewhat
different feel of yoke as if there was a rubbing or stiffness [in]
yoke elevator. I checked the elevator two more times feeling the
same stiffness, but having elevator authority I elected to
continue the takeoff as we were approaching V [speeds]
rapidly. On climbout I asked the Captain to take the flight
controls after we had been ‘cleaned up’ and cleared on course
for 2-3 minutes. He took the flight controls and felt the same
rubbing or stiffness of the elevator and immediately said we
are going back… Normal approach and landing and taxi into
blocks [were made]…
The next day one of our assistant Chief Pilots informed the
Captain and me that…[my] crotch seatbelt was found in the
floor in the slot where the yoke sits… Having never worn the
crotch belt (between the legs of the 5-point harness) and
having had numerous check rides, line checks, simulator
supports on type rides, and having never been corrected to the
contrary, and having never witnessed our own Captains using
this part of the harness, I thought it was optional. I must
confess I had tried it on before but did not use it because of the
discomfort… A different assistant Chief Pilot suggested I
should start wearing the belt, which I do [now].
The unused belt was only part of the problem here. The
control column seal in this older aircraft (DC-8) was
apparently not maintained properly, allowing the unused
belt strap to become caught in the base of the column.
Number 258 February 2001
High-Stakes Flights from ASRS Files
Flight crews of multi-engine aircraft experiencing engine
or system failures during flight often can proceed to
destination without making a precautionary landing. The
decision to do so is generally safe because of system
redundancies, well-honed crew coordination procedures,
and other factors. But when an engine failure occurs over
water, safety margins can quickly shrink, as highlighted
by this First Officer’s report.
During scheduled (overflow) flight over ocean, our
aircraft suffered a catastrophic engine failure. Our Chief
Pilot was acting as Pilot Not Flying (PNF) and Captain.
After shutdown and feather of the #2 engine, we
determined that the nearest suitable airport for landing
was [on a Caribbean island]. I, as First Officer,
recommended [this airport] for diversion as was required
(flight to nearest suitable airport) by our company’s ops
manual. The Captain overruled this and determined that
our flight should continue on to its next destination –
maintenance base of operations [over twice as far].
Arguments made in defense of this decision included the
following: (1) As Chief Pilot, the Captain felt a
responsibility to return the flight to the maintenance base;
(2) he did not want to spend the night away from home; (3)
this was a [standby aircraft] that was not originally
scheduled to fly.
The First Officer implies that the Captain’s decision was
questionable, but the Captain may have had motivations
other than those noted for continuing to the company
base. The closest airport during an emergency may not
always be the most “suitable” because of weather, crew
familiarity with the airport, runway length, and other
important considerations.
Hurry-up pressures are evident in this report from a
flight crew that ignored safe operating procedures in a
rush to take off:
The Captain’s elevator trim was erroneous compared
to the surface position indicator, First Officer’s and
normal revolutions from zero. It read from 4 to 12 units
up at the takeoff range from the other indicators. It was
decided to take off after discussion...with throttles above
50%. The takeoff warning sounded and takeoff was
aborted at less than 20 knots. Returned to the gate for
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