曝光台 注意防骗
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final for Runway 09 at ABC, and UNICOM mentioned
that a glider was preparing to leave for Runway 27. The
tow pilot said they would be ready in 2 minutes. We
thought this meant that the glider and tow were holding
short, since no word was said that the aircraft were
actually on Runway 27. We radioed that we would
continue for Runway 09. No one said anything else.
While touching down on Runway 09, we saw the glider at
the fixed distance markers of Runway 27. Fortunately
there was enough room to stop safely before reaching the
glider. After our plane was parked, I talked with the
people at the FBO, explaining that “in preparation for
Runway 27” sounds like the aircraft were holding short,
and that it would be helpful to clearly state that the glider
is on the runway so that there would be no mistake. ABC
is in mountainous terrain and is a challenging airport to
service. When in doubt, circle.
UNICOM operators may not be able to provide all the
information an inbound pilot needs, and sometimes may
not even have a clear view of the runways. In addition,
prudence would suggest that a flight crew discontinue
their straight-in approach when faced with soon-to-depart
opposite direction traffic.
A report from a general aviation pilot describes how lack
of radio communication at an uncontrolled airport led to
near-disaster.
n I called on UNICOM for landing on Runway 09, and
made a call entering base. On final, I had a red and white
light on the VASI, and at approximately 100-150 feet AGL,
I just caught sight of a helicopter low and left of me,
coming up. I tried to pull up to the right, but the
helicopter’s rotor impacted my left flap and left horizontal
stabilizer. I made an uneventful landing. I did not hear
any radio calls from the other aircraft. The helicopter
should have made position calls. Additionally, crossing
the approach end of an active runway should not be done
at glide-slope altitude. This just shows that [a mid-air
collision] can happen anywhere in a traffic pattern.
One wonders what the helicopter pilot was thinking when
crossing the approach end of the runway, as reported.
However, pilots should also keep in mind that radios are
not required at uncontrolled airports, and that many
aircraft are not radio-equipped.
n Operations delayed us on
the ground for over an hour due to
thunderstorms approaching our destination. By the time
we did get there, the thunderstorms were still overhead
the field. We were being vectored for Runway 8, then for
Runway 9. By now we were in the “get it on the ground”
mode. [Then] the ILS went down due to a lightning
strike. We followed someone else’s lead and called for a
visual approach in marginal VFR. On final at 500 feet,
Tower called the winds at 230 degrees at 17 knots. This
was greater than 10 knots of tailwind and on a very wet
runway. But in the mindset we were in, rational thought
did not appear.
The Captain struggled with windshear all the way down,
and floated it halfway down the runway before
touchdown. One reverser didn’t deploy and the other was
drifting us off centerline. Now on brakes only, we stopped
in the last 1,000 feet of rain-soaked, rubber-deposited
runway.
It was “shear” luck that this aircraft didn’t roll off the end
of the runway.
Windshear can come as a big surprise even when the
Uncontrolled Shouldn't Mean Uncommunicative
Shear Luck–And Training
properly programmed with the arrival and altitude over fix.
LNAV and VNAV were engaged, and the aircraft was
descending properly. (The altitude crossing restriction was
projected to be 13,000 feet by the computer.) As a line check
airman doing Initial Operating Experience (IOE) with a
new Captain, we began to discuss the LDA ‘A’ approach (we
were at FL240 at the time) because it is very important for
new Captains to know the FMC thoroughly...During this
discussion neither of us was watching the aircraft very well
because of our interest in the approach and because the
aircraft was engaged in VNAV. Just past the fix, our
discussion ended and our attention went back to the aircraft
situation as we anticipated flight below 10,000 feet and the
checklists. Much to our amazement, we were descending to
13,000 feet from 17,000 feet. We had missed the crossing
restriction by over 4,000 feet! The computer was still in VNAV
and LNAV with appropriate annunciations on the FMA.
I immediately knew what had happened. The [aircraft]
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