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appeared to slow down. Then he was observed to speed up
toward Taxiway Z, putting him on a collision course with
the jet. ATC instructed the [student] to stop, which he did,
but he had already crossed the hold line. The jet had to
move to the side of the taxiway to get by.
[Later] the student stated that he had heard and understood
the instructions. He stated that his instructors had taught
him to “help out” the controllers whenever he felt he could.
He was certain he could “beat out” the jet. The instructor
supported the student’s viewpoint.
There are ways to “help out”–with accurate position reports,
etc.–but not following an ATC instruction is not a help.
In another report, marginal weather and rising terrain in
the direction of flight should have encouraged the pilot to
follow the vectors provided by the reporter, a Departure
controller frustrated in his efforts to keep the pilot on
course.
n The aircraft had filed direct to XYZ VORTAC, and on
to the southeast at 9,000 feet. I issued a route direct ABC
VORTAC [to the northwest] climbing to 5,000 feet, since
as filed would have put the aircraft in Center’s airspace
without prior coordination. There is very rapidly rising
terrain and obstructions as you proceed southeast from
here, while to the northwest the terrain is lower. The
aircraft took off and was tracking southeast. He stated
that he was going to ABC VORTAC. As he proceeded
southeast, I lost communication with him, and observed
him level at 5,000 feet. By the time I was able to reestablish
communication, he was ten miles southeast of
here and he still said he was proceeding direct to ABC
VORTAC. After getting the aircraft identified, I was able
to issue a clearance on course and climb him to 9,000 feet.
The pilot probably figured, “Why go northwest when the
controller will probably put me on course [to the southeast]
right away. The controller only wants to delay me…” Or,
there was a complete loss of situational awareness by the
pilot, blindly flying along into rapidly rising terrain, and
trying to figure out why the controller was repeatedly
asking him if he was going northwest.
We issue clearances with very good plans in mind…it is to
keep you out of someone’s way, or to avoid an unplanned
close encounter with the earth.
Helping Other Crew Members
ATC’s choreography can also be disrupted due to flight
crew distraction and subsequent loss of intra-cockpit
coordination. A Captain’s report provides an example.
n While we were in level cruise at FL330, Center cleared
us to FL290, “pilot’s discretion” to 11,000 feet (or so I
thought). I dialed in 11,000 feet in the altitude window,
and the First Officer [FO] acknowledged. The first clue I
had that something was amiss was when I noticed another
aircraft…we were approaching FL270, and the FO told me
we were only cleared to FL290.
The First Officer pinpoints the causes of the confusion:
During the conversation with the controller, a conversation
was going on within the cockpit with a deadheading crew
member, which may have contributed to the FO and
Captain not verifying the altitude assignment with each
other. The crew had several tasks in progress, with
briefing, receiving ATIS, and making “in range” calls.
Although the company communications might have been
necessary, the timing of the conversation with the jump
seat passenger was inopportune, interfering with the
intra-cockpit communication that might have prevented
the altitude deviation.
Another Captain likewise attributes an altitude deviation
to workload and non-ATC communications.
n Shortly after takeoff, we were cleared to 5,000 feet. I
left the frequency to call company operations, get arrival
ATIS, and call arrival airport operations. While I was off
the frequency, we were cleared to go direct to a VOR when
reaching 3,000 feet (but ATC expected us to continue the
climb to 5,000 feet). When I got back on frequency, I asked
the FO about our latest clearance, and he said, “Direct to
the VOR, maintain 3,000 feet.”
Contributing factors were: a new Captain (one month)
paired with a new FO (two months); a 20-minute flight
[with] high workload; and the need for the pilot-not-flying
to leave the frequency three times to make required
company calls.
Company communications are important but may need to
be re-prioritized so that both crew members are available
to confirm ATC clearances.
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