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manager, and project manager.
3.2.9 Residual mishap risk. The remaining mishap risk that exists after all mitigation
techniques have been implemented or exhausted, in accordance with the system safety design
order of precedence (see 4.4).
3.2.10 Safety. Freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational
illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.
3.2.11 Subsystem. A grouping of items satisfying a logical group of functions within a
particular system.
3.2.12 System. An integrated composite of people, products, and processes that provide
a capability to satisfy a stated need or objective.
3.2.13 System safety. The application of engineering and management principles,
criteria, and techniques to achieve acceptable mishap risk, within the constraints of operational
effectiveness and suitability, time, and cost, throughout all phases of the system life cycle.
3.2.14 System safety engineering. An engineering discipline that employs specialized
professional knowledge and skills in applying scientific and engineering principles, criteria, and
techniques to identify and eliminate hazards, in order to reduce the associated mishap risk.
MIL-STD-882D
3
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
This section defines the system safety requirements to perform throughout the life cycle for any
system, new development, upgrade, modification, resolution of deficiencies, or technology
development. When properly applied, these requirements should ensure the identification and
understanding of all known hazards and their associated risks; and mishap risk eliminated or
reduced to acceptable levels. The objective of system safety is to achieve acceptable mishap risk
through a systematic approach of hazard analysis, risk assessment, and risk management. This
document delineates the minimum mandatory requirements for an acceptable system safety
program for any DoD system. When MIL-STD-882 is required in a solicitation or contract, but
no specific references are included, then only the requirements in this section are applicable.
System safety requirements consist of the following:
4.1 Documentation of the system safety approach. Document the developer's and
program manager's approved system safety engineering approach. This documentation shall:
a. Describe the program’s implementation using the requirements herein. Include
identification of each hazard analysis and mishap risk assessment process used.
b. Include information on system safety integration into the overall program structure.
c. Define how hazards and residual mishap risk are communicated to and accepted by the
appropriate risk acceptance authority (see 4.7) and how hazards and residual mishap risk will be
tracked (see 4.8).
4.2 Identification of hazards. Identify hazards through a systematic hazard analysis
process encompassing detailed analysis of system hardware and software, the environment (in
which the system will exist), and the intended use or application. Consider and use historical
hazard and mishap data, including lessons learned from other systems. Identification of hazards
is a responsibility of all program members. During hazard identification, consider hazards that
could occur over the system life cycle.
4.3 Assessment of mishap risk. Assess the severity and probability of the mishap risk
associated with each identified hazard, i.e., determine the potential negative impact of the hazard
on personnel, facilities, equipment, operations, the public, and the environment, as well as on the
system itself. The tables in Appendix A are to be used unless otherwise specified.
4.4 Identification of mishap risk mitigation measures. Identify potential mishap risk
mitigation alternatives and the expected effectiveness of each alternative or method. Mishap risk
mitigation is an iterative process that culminates when the residual mishap risk has been reduced
to a level acceptable to the appropriate authority. The system safety design order of precedence
for mitigating identified hazards is:
a. Eliminate hazards through design selection. If unable to eliminate an identified
hazard, reduce the associated mishap risk to an acceptable level through design selection.
MIL-STD-882D
4
b. Incorporate safety devices. If unable to eliminate the hazard through design selection,
reduce the mishap risk to an acceptable level using protective safety features or devices.
c. Provide warning devices. If safety devices do not adequately lower the mishap risk of
the hazard, include a detection and warning system to alert personnel to the particular hazard.
d. Develop procedures and training. Where it is impractical to eliminate hazards through
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System Safety Handbook系统安全手册下(113)
