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7.3.1 Attendance Schedule .............................................................................. 20
7.3.2 Familiarisation and Preliminary Observations ................................... 21
7.3.3 Determining Category Parameters ....................................................... 21
DSTO-TR-1034
7.3.4 Collecting Trial Data ............................................................................... 21
8. RESULTS/DISCUSSION................................................................................................. 21
8.1 Familiarisation and Preliminary Observations................................................. 21
8.1.1 10/27 Regiment: Battalion and Company Headquarters .................. 21
8.1.2 Team Category Parameters.................................................................... 22
8.1.2.1 Observable Team Behaviour.................................................................. 22
8.1.2.2 Team Behaviour Sampling Methods .................................................... 22
8.1.3 Taskwork Category Parameters ............................................................ 25
8.1.3.1 Observable Task Behaviour ................................................................... 25
8.1.3.2 Taskwork Sampling Methods................................................................ 26
8.2 Trial Data.................................................................................................................. 26
8.3 Comparing Team Processes .................................................................................. 29
8.4 Collecting Data in Army HQ During Military Exercises ................................ 30
8.5 Conclusions.............................................................................................................. 31
9. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................................. 31
10.REFERENCES..................................................................................................................... 32
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY ............................................................................................... 34
APPENDIX B: DATA COLLECTION PROFORMAS.................................................. 35
B.1. Objective Taskload Measurement Sheet ~ Draft..................................................... 35
B.2. Team Behaviour Measurement Sheet ~ Draft .......................................................... 36
DSTO-TR-1034
GLOSSARY
2IC Second in Command
ACTA Applied Cognitive Task Analysis
AO Area of Operations
BCSS Battlefield Command Support System
Bde HQ Brigade Headquarters
Bn HQ Battalion Headquarters
Bn CP Battalion Command Post
CHQ Company Headquarters
C2 Command and Control
CO Commanding Officer
Ex RC00 Exercise Rhino Charge 2000
HQ Headquarters
INT Intelligence Cell
KSA knowledge, skills, and attitude
LO Liaison Officers
LOG Logistics
MAP Military Appreciation Process
OPS Operations
SMM Shared Mental Model
TADMUS Tactical Decision Making Under Stress project
TLX Task Load Index
TPOM Team Performance Outcome Measure
DSTO-TR-1034
1
1. Introduction
1.1 Human Factors Problems In Military Command Teams
Over recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the human component of
military Command and Control (C2). A variety of tragedies have demonstrated that
one of the largest influences on system performance is the human factor. Human
error has been found to be responsible for 60% to 80% of fatal aviation accidents, and
communication issues were found to be involved in more than 70% of accidents
(Brannick, Prince, Prince & Salas, 1995). The suggestion is that a large influence on
effective performance is the way humans interact with each other. Thus, a critical
determinant of performance is the team behaviour.
Nowhere was this influence seen so strongly as in the USS Vincennes incident. In
1988, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Vincennes fired two SM-2 missiles at a
civilian Iranian airbus leaving no survivors (Gregory & Kelly, 1998). The CO made
his decision to engage based on information he received from crew members in the
Combat Information Centre (Klein, 1993). What is noteworthy is that all equipment
on the Vincennes (except the forward gun) worked impeccably throughout the
incident. Likewise, the information needed to prevent the tragedy was readily
available to the crew.
This incident sparked a congressionally mandated research project, and it has been
suggested that the dynamics of the command team were the cause of the tragedy. In
particular, the extent to which the team dynamics influenced the interpretation of the
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