• 热门标签

当前位置: 主页 > 航空资料 > 国外资料 >

时间:2010-08-11 13:26来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:admin
曝光台 注意防骗 网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者

This study concluded that, in the icing conditions tested, the C16195BA
standard performed better while saying, nevertheless, that for technical
reasons it was not possible to reproduce in the wind tunnel all the conditions
that may be encountered in reality.
At the end of March 2009, there were two new events with a temporary loss of
speed indications at Air France, including the first event on A330.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
67
On 15 April 2009, Airbus informed Air France of the results of the study
carried out by Thales. Airbus pointed out that icing with ice crystals was a new
phenomenon that had not been taken into account in the development of the
Thales C16195BA probe, but that this model seemed to provide a significant
improvement regarding the incorrect speed indications at high altitude.
Airbus proposed an “in-service assessment” of the C16195BA standard to Air
France, in order to verify the behaviour of the probe in a real situation.
Air France decided to immediately extend this measure to all of its long-range
A330/ A340 fleet and to replace all of the speed probes. An internal technical
document to launch the modification was issued on 27 April 2009. The start
of airplane modifications was planned to take place on reception of the parts.
The first batch of C16195BA Pitot probes arrived at Air France on 26 May 2009,
that is to say six days before the F-GZCP accident.
At the time of the accident, F-GZCP was equipped with C16195AA probes.

F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
69
FINDINGS
(New findings established since the Interim Report on 2 July 2009 appear in italics)
 The crew possessed the licenses and ratings required to undertake the flight.
 The airplane possessed a valid Certificate of Airworthiness, and had been
maintained in accordance with the regulations.
 The airplane had taken off from Rio de Janeiro without any known technical
problems, except on one of the three radio management panels.
 No problems were indicated by the crew to Air France or during contacts
with the Brazilian controllers.
 No distress messages were received by the control centres or by other
airplanes.
 There were no satellite telephone communications between the airplane
and the ground.
 The last radio exchange between the crew and Brazilian ATC occurred at
1 h 35 min 15. The airplane was arriving at the edge of radar range of the
Brazilian control centres.
 At 2 h 01, the crew tried, without success for the third time, to connect to
the Dakar ATC ADS-C system.
 Up to the last automatic position point, received at 2 h 10 min 34, the flight
had followed the route indicated in the flight plan.
 The meteorological situation was typical of that encountered in the month
of June in the inter-tropical convergence zone.
 There were powerful cumulonimbus clusters on the route of AF447. Some
of them could have been the centre of some notable turbulence.
 An additional meteorological analysis shows the presence of strong
condensation towards AF447’s flight level probably associated with convection
phenomena.
 The precise composition of the cloud masses above 30,000 feet is little known,
in particular with regard to the super-cooled water/ice crystal diving, especially
with regard to the size of the latter.
 Several airplanes that were flying before and after AF 447, at about the
same altitude, altered their routes in order to avoid cloud masses.
 Twenty-four automatic maintenance messages were received between
2 h 10 and 2 h 15 via the ACARS system. These messages show an
inconsistency in the measured speeds as well as the associated
consequences.
 Before 2 h 10, no maintenance messages had been received from AF 447, with
the exception of two messages relating to the confi guration of the toilets.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
70
 Twenty-one messages present on the CFR are caused or can be caused by
anemometric problems;
 None of the messages present in the CFR indicate loss of displays or inertial
information (attitudes);
 The operator’s and the manufacturer’s procedures mention actions to be
undertaken by the crew when they have doubts as to the accuracy of the
speed indications,
 The last ACARS message was received towards 2 h 14 min 28,
 The flight was not transferred between the Brazilian and Senegalese
control centres,
 Between 8 h 00 and 8 h 30, the first emergency alert messages were sent
by the Madrid and Brest control centres,
 The first bodies and airplane parts were found on 6 June,
 
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址:航空资料5(85)