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of radar for weather avoidance had actually been
practiced during the period of his Line Training.
2.6.1.4. It is recognized that all airborne weather radars do
operate in a similar fashion and on broadly the same
38
principles. However, there are significant differences
between modern, ‘flat-plate’ antenna radars, such as the
RDR-4B, and older, parabolic antenna radars. These
older radars, on which many senior pilots gained
experience, have up to 15 times the power of modern
radars, are able to detect close-in weather at lower
altitudes relative to the aircraft due to large side lobes
and generally require less ‘effort’ to interpret a radar
picture. In comparison, the RDR-4B radar focuses
radar energy in a narrow ‘pencil’ beam, the power of
which is greatest at the centre and reduces as the
angular distance from the centre of the beam increases,
with little energy emitted as extraneous side lobes. The
narrow beam and loss of side lobes make tilt and range
control more critical. The beam width of the RDR-4B
radar is nominally 3 degrees. The radar energy is
focused at the middle of the 3-degree beam, reducing to
half power at the edge of the beam. Thus while radar
targets having good reflectivity may produce returns
from the 3 degree periphery, targets with less
reflectivity may not ‘paint’ at all.
2.6.1.5. From the way in which the weather radar was operated,
as described by the flight crew, the investigation team is
of the opinion that the flight crew had not been provided
with sufficient technical and guidance information, nor
39
was there clear evidence that they were adequately
trained to operate the RDR-4B Weather Radar. In this
respect, the regulatory authority should consider
stepping up regulatory oversight of the training
standards of operators, with a view to ensuring a more
comprehensive coverage of weather radar operation and
weather avoidance procedures for flight crew.
2.6.1.6. Without CVR and weather radar recording, the
investigation into the accident and the operation of the
weather radar had to rely on the description of the radar
settings selected and observations by the flight crew,
based on their recollection of events prior to the
accident. Because of the nature of the evidence
available, the above therefore can best be regarded as
the most probable scenario leading up to the accident.
However, based on the training documentation and
records available, and considering the importance of
proper use of weather radar to flight safety, it can be
concluded with reasonable certainty that there has been
insufficient emphasis placed on the training of the flight
crew in its use.
2.6.2. Weather Briefing to Cabin Crew
2.6.2.1. According to the operator’s A330 Operational Notice
75/02, titled “Turbulent Air”, flight crew were required
40
to study the weather charts and SIGMET’s for areas of
possible turbulence, and to brief CP or SP prior to each
departure with regard to the approximate time during
the flight that these weather conditions may be
encountered. Although one of the flight crew believed
that the CP had been briefed on the weather conditions
prior to departure from Kota Kinabalu, neither the CP
nor the SP could recall that this had been done. The
investigation could not establish if the flight crew had
actually briefed the CP or the SP on the possibility of a
turbulence encounter in accordance with the operator’s
A330 Operational Notice No. 75/02. However, given
that the flight conditions were reported to be ‘bumpy’
with ‘light chop’ experienced during the previous sector
from Hong Kong to Kota Kinabalu, the cabin crew
would not have anticipated a smooth ride on the return
flight to Hong Kong. The effects of whether such a
briefing had actually been conducted therefore remain
relatively insignificant.
2.6.2.2. The investigation team noted that the A330 Operational
Notice 75/02 was withdrawn on 18 July 2003. The
operator explained that withdrawal of the Notice on the
day of the accident was purely coincidental.
Operational Notice 59/03 on the same subject was
subsequently issued on 22 August 2003 as it was
41
considered that there was a need to remind crew
members again of the requirement for flight crew to
conduct weather briefing to cabin crew in light of
further incidents involving air turbulence in the
preceding weeks.
2.7. Handling of the Injured and Cabin Management
2.7.1. All cabin crew interviewed stated that the preparation of the cabin
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