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8.0 LOCKHEED MARTIN WORKING GROUP REPORT
8.1 Introduction
This report summarizes Lockheed Martin’s evaluation of the L-1011 fuel system in support of the
AFSSP. Discussed below are the approach taken, inspection procedure used, findings, and actions
being implemented in response to the inspection program results.
8.2 Scope
In accordance with the guidelines set out by the Fuel System Safety Leadership Team, Lockheed
Martin performed inspections to assess all aspects of the L-1011 fuel tank system (e.g., aircraft
wiring condition, component condition, bonding). A design review helped identify specific areas
of interest to be inspected.
8.3 Working Group Team
At the time of inception of the AFSSP, the Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems Company of
Marietta, Georgia, was the OEM facility responsible for the L-1011. The Marietta facility is
credited for the initial research and development of the Lockheed Martin L-1011 contribution to
the AFSSP. In 1998, the L-1011 program transferred from Marietta to the Lockheed Martin
Aircraft and Logistics Centers (LMALC) facility in Greenville, South Carolina. LMALC, a
sustaining rather than production organization, continues to support the AFSSP.
The L-1011 family consists of variations of the basic configuration. Models include the L-1011-1,
L-1011-1-14, L-1011-1-15, and L-1011-3 models. Each of these models corresponds to specific
gross takeoff weight capabilities, fuel tank arrangements, and engine types. The L-1011 family
encompasses similar fuel system design philosophies and criteria common to all models.
8.4 Team Composition
The Lockheed Martin Working Group comprises the OEM and the three primary operators of the
currently active Lockheed Martin L-1011 fleet: Delta Air Lines (24% of fleet), American Trans
Air (16% of fleet), and Air Transat (12% of fleet) as of December 31, 1999.
Credit goes to Delta Air Lines for its participation and help in developing the inspection procedure
document. Delta provided aircraft access and assisted with preliminary inspection method trials
and photographs. American Trans Air’s voluntary participation in the fuel tank inspection program
is also gratefully acknowledged. ATA provided access to aircraft and personnel resources that
greatly facilitated the development and execution of the Lockheed Martin Working Group fuel
tank inspection program. The voluntary efforts of the Lockheed Martin Working Group L-1011
operators made the inspection program possible and are greatly appreciated.
8.0 Lockheed Martin Working Group Report (continued)
Page 74 Industry AFFSP Report August 4, 2000
8.5 Working Group Approach
The Lockheed Martin Working Group approached the AFSSP industry commitment by evaluating
the design principles used in the production of the L-1011 fuel system. All relevant drawings were
reviewed to ensure that applicable safety measures had been incorporated into the fuel system
design.
In addition to proven Lockheed Martin fuel system design requirements, military specifications
such as MIL–F–8615 (Fuel System Components: General Specifications for) and MIL–B–5087
(Bonding, Electrical, and Lightning Protection for Aerospace Systems) were used as a basis of
safe design criteria for the drawing evaluation. Materials, methods, and processes were evaluated
for the areas of concern established by the FSSLT. Incorporated design practices were confirmed
to meet or exceed the referenced criteria.
After the incorporated design practices were verified, an instructional document was created to
provide procedures for conducting the fuel tank inspections.
8.6 Inspection Program
Following FSSLT guidelines, the Lockheed Martin Working Group defined an airplane inspection
plan to accomplish the following:
! Assess during major maintenance checks the in-service condition of fuel tanks and systems
in the commercial fleets of participating L-1011 operators.
! Analyze and share significant findings.
! Enhance future design, operations, and maintenance practices.
The Lockheed Martin Working Group defined specific inspection categories based on the areas of
concern identified by the AFSSP. Specific items to be inspected for included the following:
! Integrity of wiring and bonding straps.
! Condition of FQIS wiring and components.
! Condition of fuel pumps, fuel lines, and fittings.
! Electrical bonding and grounding of fuel system equipment.
! Presence of FOD.
! General tank condition.
In each of the above categories, components were examined for specific safety-related potential
deficiencies as discussed below.
Condition of Bonding and Grounding
Fault current bonding is designed to protect an aircraft from damage if any electrical equipment
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