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Different airplane working groups (AWG) in the AFSSP addressed the airplanes in the world fleet
built by different original equipment manufacturers (OEM). The AWG OEMs began by reviewing
! Their fuel system design requirements.
! The drawings used to build their airplanes.
! The processes used to manufacture and install the fuel systems of their airplanes.
Following this comprehensive review of fuel system design and manufacture, the AFSSP defined
the requirements for a sampling inspection program to be conducted of the in-service airliner fleet.
AFSSP participants—operators, OEMs, or both together—performed the actual inspections.
1.0 Executive Summary (continued)
Page 2 Industry AFFSP Report August 4, 2000
1.3 Scope
The AFSSP, a voluntary industry program, has gathered ample information about the overall
integrity of the design and maintenance of the in-service fleet. Well over 100,000 labor-hours have
been expended performing inspections of the world fleet. As of June 1, 2000, inspections have
been completed on 990 airplanes operated by 160 air carriers in diverse operating environments on
six continents. A small number of additional inspections remain to be performed and are
scheduled for completion in 2000. This effort attests to the industry’s ongoing commitment to
continuously enhancing the safety of air travel.
1.4 About This Document
This document presents the final report of the AFSSP. In Section 2, the AFSSP participants are
identified, the overall results of the inspection effort is given, and industry recommendations for
continued and enhanced fuel system safety are presented.
Sections 3 through 8 of this document are the individual reports of the six AWGs: Airbus, BAE
SYSTEMS, Boeing (including former Douglas / McDonnell Douglas commercial jetliners),
Bombardier, Fokker, and Lockheed Martin. These AWG reports offer detailed, OEM-specific
inspection findings about the respective in-service fleets. They describe actions that have been
taken or are being taken as a result of the findings.
It should be noted that this document addresses only the AFSSP, which is just one of many
important efforts undertaken by the aviation industry to enhance fuel systems in response to the
loss of TWA Flight 800. Examples of other activities that are providing valuable insight and
actions to enhance airplane fuel system safety include the TWA 800 accident investigation; the
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Fuel Tank Harmonization Working Group
(FTHWG); the FAA’s Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) 99-18 “Transport Airplane Fuel
Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction, and Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements;” the Aging Aircraft System program; numerous government- and industrysponsored
research projects; ongoing regulatory authority continued airworthiness programs; and
manufacturer and operator safety programs. These activities are generating and will continue to
generate improvements and enhancements to aircraft fuel systems.
1.5 Findings
Overall, the design /manufacturing reviews and fleet-sampling inspections performed by the
AFSSP have shown that fuel tanks and fuel systems are not degrading over time, and that
manufacturers’ design requirements are conservative and provide ample design margin as well as
built-in redundancy.
! Fuel systems were generally found to be in good to excellent condition unless subject to
initial manufacturing error or subsequent modification or damage.
! No indications were found that components or installed wiring were being adversely
affected on a long-term basis by prolonged exposure to the fuel tank environment.
1.0 Executive Summary (continued)
August 4, 2000 Industry AFFSP Report Page 3
! No correlation was found between geographic location of airplane operation and fuel
system integrity.
! In some instances, degradation was found in bonding values relative to original manufacturing
specifications, but the measured values were well within safe margins for continued
airworthiness. Each manufacturer is addressing any unique issues related to its fleet.
! The vast majority of bonding jumpers were found in as-manufactured condition—there
were isolated instances of broken, corroded, or missing jumpers, but those events showed
a random distribution with no correlation to airplane age.
! Before the inspection program, findings suggested that the use of metallic conduit to route
wiring might result in unacceptable levels of degradation to the wiring. This finding was
confirmed during the inspection program and is being addressed accordingly.
! Because discrepancies generally have external causes, tanks with fewer entries are less
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