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likely to have them.
1.6 Actions and Recommendations
The results of the AFSSP have shown that issues are specific to, or unique for, a particular
manufacturer or component design, specification, process, or installation. As such, each aircraft
manufacturer is developing the necessary corrective actions to address these issues.
In particular, the industry is now addressing the existing use of metal conduit to route wire through
fuel tanks. This practice will be critically evaluated to determine how present designs can be
enhanced and whether periodic inspections are desirable. Alternate wire routing methods will be
considered for new designs to alleviate the concerns associated with this practice.
Based on AFSSP findings, the industry recommends additional training for manufacturing and
maintenance personnel, and will be reviewing or modifying the existing fuel system maintenance
practices to:
! Substantiate the integrity of bonding straps through
! Long-term periodic visual / tactile inspection to verify bond integrity.
! Enhancements to existing maintenance instructions for bonding jumper maintenance
and replacement.
! Provide periodic inspection criteria for FQIS wiring and components that are more detailed
to better define conditions and items to be inspected during general tank inspections.
! Provide for the periodic in-situ inspection of fuel pumps and associated wiring, fuel lines,
and fittings.
The following items are presently part of the periodic heavy maintenance or structural inspections
that are already being conducted, so no change to existing practices is recommended.
! Inspection for foreign object debris.
! General tank condition.
1.0 Executive Summary (continued)
Page 4 Industry AFFSP Report August 4, 2000
While the AFSSP inspection program has confirmed that manufacturers’ standards for fuel tank
bonding are effective and robust in service, it has also highlighted the fact that these standards
vary. Therefore, in addition to the bonding inspections noted above, the industry recommends that
groups such as the SAE or IEEE develop uniform standards or processes for
! Fuel tank bonding requirements and test techniques.
! Bonding jumpers used in fuel tanks.
As a final note, the AFSSP inspection program did not require the removal or teardown of fuel
system components for a detailed inspection of individual pieces and parts. However, findings
outside of this inspection program have shown that improper repair or maintenance of fuel system
components can lead to safety issues. The industry therefore believes that it is critical to have
well-documented maintenance procedures and qualified repair stations and personnel maintaining
fuel system components to ensure that design integrity is maintained.
1.7 Conclusions
In the wake of the TWA 800 disaster, questions were raised as to whether airplane fuel systems
were deteriorating as airplanes aged in commercial service. As described above, the large-scale
design review and in-service airplane fleet inspection effort performed by the industry via the
AFSSP has answered these concerns with facts and data showing that the fuel tank systems of the
world fleet are soundly designed and do not tend to degrade as airplanes age. This survey process
has also showed where improvements can be made to further enhance fuel-system safety and
ensure the continuing airworthiness of the in-service fleet.
August 4, 2000 Industry AFFSP Report Page 5
2.0 OVERVIEW
2.1 Introduction
On July 17, 1996, a Boeing model 747-131 operated by Trans World Airlines, Inc., (TWA)
exploded in flight shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York.
This tragic accident launched the most complicated and comprehensive wreckage recovery,
aircraft reconstruction, and accident investigation in the history of commercial aviation. An
investigation headed by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has not, as of this date,
determined the primary cause of the accident. Information gathered from the investigation
suggests that the airplane’s center wing fuel tank exploded. However, the ignition source remains
unidentified.
On December 13, 1996, the NTSB issued four preliminary recommendations for changes in
regulations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). On April 3, 1997, the FAA issued a
notice soliciting public comments on the feasibility of implementing these recommendations. This
notice addressed a wide variety of subjects. In support of the FAA’s request for comments,
airplane manufacturers and airline operators from around the world decided to combine their
expertise and jointly initiated a comprehensive review of fuel system design and airline
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