曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
Albert Urdiroz, and Alberto Grande), it would not have been possible to achieve this level of
integration and produce results in a timely manner.
Many thanks go to Ms. Barb Meloche and Ms. Katherine McFadden for their diligent work on
data issues, integrations, and database management and to the staff at the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center who retrieved the data
from the Airclaims databases. Special thanks also go to Ms. Nancy Lies for technical editing.
The guidance and funding support from Mr. Bob McGuire and Mr. Robert Jones of the FAA are
greatly appreciated. Mark Allen and Dick Perry of Sandia National Laboratories provided
mentorship and direction to the entire project and made the work enjoyable.
iii/iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xi
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. SCOPE AND SAFETY PHILOSOPHY 2
3. METHODOLOGY 4
3.1 Study Framework 4
3.2 Review of Regulatory Requirements and Maintenance Planning Documents 6
3.2.1 Code of Federal Regulations and Joint Aviation Regulation
Regulatory Requirements 6
3.2.2 Maintenance Practices 6
3.3 Review of Design Requirements, System/Assembly/Unit Drawings, Aircraft
Maintenance Manuals, and Component Maintenance Manuals 6
3.4 Review of Initial Assessment at Certification 6
3.5 Review of In-Service Data 7
3.5.1 The A320 Aircraft Fleet Information 7
3.5.2 Repair Data From Original Equipment Manufacturers 7
3.5.3 Airclaims Database/FAA National Aviation Safety Data Analysis
Center 8
3.6 Graphical Presentations of Life Data 8
3.7 Analysis of Risk 9
3.7.1 Overview of the Life Cycle Approach 9
3.7.2 Models, Diagnostics, and Challenges 12
4. RESULTS 14
4.1 Risk Analysis 14
4.2 Hazard Assessment Tables 14
v
5. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND ISSUES 16
5.1 Performance Dependent on Design Complexity 16
5.2 Dependence Between Redundant Paths 16
5.3 Soft Failures 16
5.4 Zero Time Assumption Challenged on Refurbished Assemblies 17
5.5 Aging Issues 17
5.6 Bearing Wear 17
5.7 Corrosion Issues 18
5.8 Optimal Maintenance Intervals 18
5.9 Minimum Performance Differences Among Operators 18
5.10 Functional Checks 18
6. SUMMARY 18
6.1 Society of Automotive Engineers Standards 18
6.2 Future Safety Assessment at Certification 19
6.3 Validation Once in Life of Fleet 19
6.4 Data Quality and Limitations of Study 20
6.5 Preventative Use and/or Regulatory Compliance 20
6.6 Future Opportunities 20
7. CONCLUSIONS 21
8. RECOMMENDATIONS 21
9. REFERENCES 22
10. RELATED DOCUMENTS 22
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1 The A320 Family Rudder Control System and Critical Components 3
2 Heinrich Pyramid 4
3 Study Process Framework 5
4 A Typical Illustration of Units Removed as a Function of Time 8
5 Cumulative Probability Function 10
6 Cumulative Probability—Quantile Display 10
7 Probability Density Function 11
8 Hazard/Removal Function 12
vii
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1 Regulatory Risk Thresholds 6
2 The AFU Hazard Assessment Table 15
3 System Hazard Assessment (Partial) 15
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AC Advisory Circular
AD Airworthiness Directive and/or Accidental Damage
AFU Artificial Feel Unit
AMM Aircraft Maintenance Manuals
ARP Aerospace Recommended Practice
CCA Common Cause Analysis
CFR Code of Federal Regulation
CMM Component Maintenance Manual
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FMES Failure Modes and Effects Summary
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
HA Hazard Assessment
JAR Joint Aviation Regulation
LRU Line Replacement Unit
MPD Maintenance Planning Document
MSG Maintenance Steering Group or Materiel Safety Group
NASDAC National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers
SB Service Bulletin
SNL Sandia National Laboratories
SSA System Safety Analyses
VSS Microsoft® Visual SourceSafe®
ix/x
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This project was initiated due to safety concerns that arose from the TWA Flight 800 accident in
1996. In the years after the accident, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aging Aircraft
Program and its advisory committee, the Aging Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory
Committee, expanded their evaluations of aging to include nonstructural wiring and flight
control systems. It was decided that potential generic problems with those systems should be
identified and addressed at the industry level. In 2002, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was
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