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e. Airbus failed to design an appropriately redundant flight control sys tem that
provides protection by limiting the rudder’s ability to generate excessive
lateral loads on the aircraft structure.
f. Airbus failed to responsibly investigate and report resolutions to prior inservice
events.
g. Aircraft certification authorities failed to require the quantitative evaluation of
flight characteristics and handling qualities for a derivative aircraft design,
thereby ensuring that the derivative model was not susceptible to the hazards
of APC.
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h. Aircraft certification authorities failed to require quantitative aircraft flight
characteristic and handling quality testing in the presence of wake vortices as
part of the approval process of new and derivative aircraft designs.
i. Regulatory and certification authorities failed to ensure that airmen had proper
knowledge of structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical
stabilizer.
j. Regulatory authorities failed to ensure mitigation of the risks presented by the
wake vortices of aircraft now approaching 1 million pounds gross weight and
generating significantly stronger and more violent disturbed air masses than
those originally tested in determining criterion for safe aircraft spacing.
k. Regulatory authorities incorrectly defined maneuvering speed (Va) leading to
an industry-wide misconception of the fundamental principle.
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2. INTRODUCTION
“System safety is a specialty within system engineering that supports program risk
management. It is the application of engineering and management principles, criteria
and techniques to optimize safety. The goal of system safety is to optimize safety by the
identification of safety related risks, eliminating or controlling them by design and/or
procedures, based on acceptable system safety precedence” (3. 3-2).
The FAA System Safety Handbook
In order for the reader to best understand the complex factors of the AA 587 accident, the
Facts, Analyses and Recommendations portion of this report is divided into four main
areas:
· Flight Control System
· Flight Environment
· Adverse Aircraft Pilot Coupling
· Oversight
Each section contains facts and analysis followed by recommendations.
This was a complex accident. The Allied Pilots Association (APA) offers this Submission
to aid the Safety Board in its analysis. Suggestions for specific safety recommendations
that APA believes should be a part of the Final Report are compiled at the end of the
report.
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3. FACTS, ANALYSES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
“Control forces should not be so high that the pilot cannot safely maneuver the airplane.
Also the forces should not be so light that it would take exceptional skill to maneuver the
airplane without overstressing it or losing control. The airplane response to any control
input should be predictable to t he pilot.” [Emphasis added.]
FAA Advisory Circular 25-7A
In civil aviation, an airplane is judged airworthy by meeting certification standards
established in commercial aviation by FAR Part 25 or the European equivalent. The basis
of this assurance of airworthiness is an understanding that the manufacturer has proven
the proper functioning of the airplane systems, such as the Flight Control System (FCS).
This proof is obtained through extensive analysis, simulation, and flight testing in all
possible flight conditions. The investigation of AA 587 uncovered a lack of design and
regulatory oversight and questionable engineering practices as the airplane evolved from
its original certification basis, the A300B2-1A. The aircraft was adapted over time with a
significantly modified FCS—without updating the original certification basis or
complying with bilateral agreements between the United States and French
manufacturers.
The A300B2-1A airplane2 was the first Airbus design, literally their launch vehicle as an
airplane manufacturer. The FCS was a standard hydro- mechanical, servo-control system,
incorporating an analog computer for flight augmentation functions. This was necessary
to address undesirable handling qualities such as Dutch roll in the lateral axis. By the
1980s, digital technology began to supercede analog technologies, and Airbus moved to
modify the original design with digital autopilot and flight augmentation computers while
maintaining the same basic flight control architecture—except in the primary FCS of the
rudder design and the secondary FCS system of the spoilers. In 1982, the A310/A300B4-
600 aircraft used digital computers and limited Fly-by-Wire (FBW) technologies with
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