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actual overspeed warnings received by the crew may have been larger than the
number recorded. Examination of other recorded parameters indicated that the
overspeed warnings were spurious.
ADIRU 1 normally supplies the captain’s PFD with IR and ADR parameters. The
spikes in many of these parameters would have led to fluctuations and loss of data
on the captain’s PFD. At 0443:45 UTC, the source of IR parameters for the
captain’s PFD was switched from IR 1 (ADIRU 1) to IR 3 (ADIRU 3).25 This
action provided valid IR parameters to the PFD; however ADR parameters were
still being sourced from ADR 1 (ADIRU 1).
A master caution aural alert (a single chime) occurs when certain types of failure
messages appear on the ECAM. Separate master caution parameters for the captain
and first officer were recorded by the FDR. The first master caution occurred at
0440:29 UTC and repetitive master cautions were recorded from this time until the
FDR was powered down on the ground at Learmonth.
The PRIM faults are discussed in Review of PRIM monitoring functions.
Aircraft examination
Structural examination
Visual inspection of the aircraft found no missing or loose fasteners, no creases or
folds in the fuselage skin and no signs of distress to any of the fuselage, wing or
empennage skin, fairing panels or flight controls.
The FDR data showed that the peak g loadings during the flight were +1.56 g and
- 0.80 g, with almost no lateral g loading. The conditional inspection section of the
Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) (Section 05-51-17, Inspections after flight in
excessive turbulence or in excess of VMO) defined the normal flight operating range
as -1.0 g to +2.5 g. Aircraft operation within this environment did not require
additional inspections. Based on the review of the FDR data, the aircraft
manufacturer asked for a visual inspection of the elevator servo-control attachment
fittings. The inspection found no problems.
Cargo hold inspection
Inspection of the cargo area found all cargo was loaded in the correct position as
recorded on the load manifest for the flight and no load shift was evident. All of the
cargo containers and palletised cargo remained properly secured by the integral
cargo restraint systems built into the floor of the cargo holds. Each individual
freight container and pallet was also examined for load shift or break out of
25 This change was consistent with the crew selecting the ATT HDG switch to the CAPT ON 3
position at about this time in response to an ECAM message.
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individual items from within each unit. None was evident. After removal of the
cargo, the aircraft hold’s structure and restraint systems were inspected for damage
which might be attributed to the event. No anomalies were found.
Once removed from the aircraft, and under the supervision of Australian Quarantine
and Customs officers, the cargo was inspected for items which might be possible
sources of electronic or electromagnetic interference. None were identified.
Wiring examinations
Due to the level of damage to ceiling panels in the cabin, all the ceiling panels were
removed and wiring looms were visually inspected. No defects were observed.
After the aircraft had been ferried to a maintenance base, the operator conducted
precautionary checks of the aircraft’s ADIRU interface wiring. The checks involved
continuity, short circuit, electrical bonding and shielding tests. No problems were
found.
Central maintenance system
The central maintenance system (CMS) enabled trouble-shooting and return-toservice
testing to be carried out rapidly from the flight deck. The hub of the CMS
was the central maintenance computer which assisted in the diagnosis of faulty
systems.
Central maintenance computer (CMC)
Each aircraft system has built-in test equipment (BITE) which is used to test system
components and detect faults and to confirm system operation following any
maintenance. Each of the aircraft’s systems communicates with the CMC and sends
it information on detected faults and any warnings indicated to the flight crew.
When the aircraft was on the ground, maintenance engineers could access the CMC
using a multi-purpose control and display unit (MCDU) from the flight deck and
obtain information from the most recent flight or earlier flights. Through using the
MCDU, BITE information from aircraft systems could be interrogated and the
systems tested.
Aircraft systems could detect faults in two ways: internally, by monitoring its own
operation, or externally, by another aircraft system which received and monitored
information from the ‘faulty’ system. For example, a fault with an ADIRU could be
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