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the side stick, depending on the type of airplane. And rudder is not a primary flight
control to induce roll under any circumstance unless normal roll control is not
functional. So the consequence of that is that the ailerons, whether you're in cruise or
whether you're elsewhere in the flight envelope, at a much slower or higher angle of
attack, ailerons and roll spoilers would continue to be your normal, usual roll control.
Rudder, on the other hand, is used to control the yaw. It's -- it's used to zero side slip. Mr.
Chatrenet spoke to it, I think, quite well, that for thrust asymmetry or drag asymmetry,
whatever the cause, if you have a yaw condition or a side slip condition, the rudder is
dimensioned and it is there to zero it out, for the pilot to apply rudder so that you end up
with this zero or reduced loading. And that's throughout the entire envelope” (243).
This confusing and obtuse statement from the Airbus Services’ Flight Training Director
is an unmistakable example of the manufacturer’s failure to provide clear guidance on the
use of the rudder in the A300.
Mr. Jacob, an Airbus test pilot, testified more directly at the public hearing. He
definitively states limitations to the rudder that were unknown to the operators:
“Yaw mode—I have to go back to what the rudder is designed for on a transport category
airplane. A rudder is there to steer the airplane during takeoff and landing roll, to decrab
in case of a crosswind landing, and to zero out any thrust or yaw asymmetry that
might occur” (527).
Both Mr. Rockliffe and Mr. Jacob qualify the use of the rudder dramatically when their
company had previously extolled the full use of all flight controls. Yet, while Mr.
Rockliffe testified about rudder limitations, and Mr. Jacob specifically delineated what a
rudder may be used for, Airbus did not publish these limitations until they issued an
FCOM Bulletin in March 2002. For years operators had apparently been operating the
A300 without proper guidance on flight control usage.
The FAA issued Type Certificates for the A300 family of aircraft stating, “This Data
Sheet which is part of Type Certificate No. A35EU prescribes conditions and limitations
under which the product for which the Type Certificate was issued meets the
airworthiness requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations.” It is unknown whether
Airbus shared their hidden flight control limitations with the FAA when the airplanes
were certified. However, it can be definitively stated that hidden flight control limitations
and intentions do not meet the airworthiness requirements of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs).
3. Maneuvering Speed
For many years, a great disservice has been done to pilots by the definition of
maneuvering speed’ (Va). The FAA is the defining authority for aviation regulation and
training in the United States. Their most basic training aid, FAA AC-61-23C: The-Pilot’s
25
Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, defines ‘maneuvering speed’ erroneously. The
AC states that:
“The maximum speed at which an airplane can be safely stalled is the design
maneuvering speed. The design maneuvering speed is a valuable reference point for the
pilot. When operating below this speed, a damaging positive flight load should not be
produced because the airplane should stall before the load becomes excessive. Any
combination of flight control usage, including full deflection of the controls, or gust loads
created by turbulence should not create an excessive air load if the airplane is operated
below maneuvering speed.”
Certainly this leads pilots to believe that they cannot damage the aircraft structure when
maneuvering below Va. Unfortunately, we now know that this is not the case as AA 587
was operating well below the published maneuvering speed.
FAR 25.1583, Operating Limitations and Information, further reinforces this mistaken
concept. This regulation requires that the Va limitation be defined in the Flight Manual in
this manner:
“The maneuvering speed VA and a statement that full application of rudder and aileron
controls, as well as maneuvers that involve angles of attack near the stall, should be
confined to speeds below this value.”
No information contrary to this definition of Va was provided by the manufacturer. There
is, therefore, no way that American Airlines or its pilots could have known that an
unusual limitation existed for maneuvering the rudder of an A300 below Va.
NTSB IIC Robert Benzon acknowledged this deficiency in his public hearing testimony,
stating:
“Many pilot training programs do not include the information about the structural limits
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