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leg on which they were pilot-flying. These interviews
will be referred to collectively as the First Line Set.
(1L) One pilot was placed on medical leave, so 14
pilots participated in 1L interviews.
3. Second line interview: conducted after
approximately one year of experience flying on the
1 All researcher access to the flight decks of commercial airliners
operating in the United States airspace was suspended before
airline operations resumed a few days after the September 11, 2001
attacks. This put an immediate end to our jump seat observations.
The terrorist attacks also had a profound effect on virtually all
active airline pilots. The nature of the attacks and the way that
airliners had been used as weapons led pilots to confront the
possibility of horrifying scenarios on their own airplanes. Pilots
found themselves asking, “What will I do if I get a call from the
back saying that a terrorist has a knife to the throat of my lead
flight attendant?” Two interviews with pilots were conducted as
scheduled in the weeks following the attacks. In both cases, the
participating pilots wanted, perhaps needed, to talk about the
consequences of the attacks on their work. It was difficult to focus
the interviews on the use of automation. These two interviews
produced data that is so different from the data collected earlier in
the study that we decided that it could not be used. These
interviews were not transcribed. During the following months,
anxieties remained high and we decided that the probability of
getting usable data from additional interviews was low. We
therefore ceased collecting interview data in October of 2001.
2 The initial interviews were conducted either by Edwin Hutchins
or Barbara Holder, each researcher doing about half of the initial
interviews. Holder conducted a majority of the subsequent
interviews, a few were conducted by Hutchins and Holder
together, and one was conducted by research assistant, Howard Au.
Both Holder and Au now work for Boeing.
line. These interviews used the same format as the
first line interview. (2L) One pilot was transferred
back to the B737, so 13 pilots participated in 2L
interviews.
4. Third line interview: conducted after
approximately eighteen months of flying on the line.
In these interviews, in addition to being asked to
recall the most recent leg on which they were pilotflying,
the pilots were asked to describe what they
would tell a pilot who is new to the airplane. (3L)
Six pilots did not reach 18 months experience prior to
9/11, so 7 pilots participated in 3L interviews.
All interviews were recorded on audiotape, and
transcribed by a research assistant3 who is a pilot
with knowledge of autoflight. The total interview
corpus comprises approximately 336,000 words.
Jump seat observations
We also observed pilots from the jump seat to
determine how pilots use the automation in flight.
Within the constraints of the sterile cockpit rule, the
jump seat provides an opportunity to talk with the
pilots while they fly and it provides a rich setting for
discussing things that are unclear to the pilot about
autoflight functioning. Field notes from the jump seat
observations complement the pilot’s descriptions in
the interviews. By comparing the two, we were able
to confirm that the interviews were reasonably good
representations of the practices the pilots actually
engaged in.
Conceptual Models of Autoflight Function
A content analysis of the interview data revealed that
pilots use a small set of simple conceptual models to
understand how the automation controls aircraft
behavior. These basic models are known to all
instrument rated pilots and are assumed by, but not
generally made explicit in, airline training. Pilot
models are also frequently organized around the
experience of the body in the physical environment
of the flight deck. Reducing thrust is typically
conceptualized as “pulling”, for example. This makes
sense because pilots grab and pull thrust levers aft in
order to manually reduce thrust. Such conceptual
models are called “embodied” (Gibbs, 2006). This
particular model covers not only the manual control
actions of the pilot, but is also extended to the
behavior of the autoflight system. Thus, the
autothrust system is said to “pull the thrust back”
even though the autoflight system itself does not pull
anything, and when this happens in the Airbus A320
3 All transcription was performed by Howard Au and checked by
Edwin Hutchins and Barbara Holder.
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