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Safety Recommendation 7 ...........................................................................20
D. OVERSIGHT .......................................................................................................21
1. Bilateral Agreement .......................................................................................21
2. Intended Rudder Usage ................................................................................23
3. Maneuvering Speed.......................................................................................24
4. Aircraft Separation Standards ......................................................................25
Safety Recommendation 8 ...........................................................................26
Safety Recommendation 9 ...........................................................................27
Safety Recommendation 10 .........................................................................27
Safety Recommendation 11 .........................................................................28
4. SUMMATION................................................................................ 29
WORKS CITED................................................................................... 30
LIST OF SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS....................................... 31
1
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
American Airlines (AA) Flight 587 departed Runway 31L at John F. Kennedy
International Airport on November 12, 2001. The A300B4-605R departed at
approximately 0916 EDT. Two FAA- licensed airmen with over 3,500 combined flight
hours in the A300B4-605R flew the aircraft observing rules, regulations, and
governances mandated by Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121. The pilots also
adhered to rules and procedures stipulated by the Federal Aviation Administratio n
(FAA), the aircraft manufacturer, Airbus, and the certificated air carrier, American
Airlines. AA Flight 587, Aircraft Registration N14053, followed a heavy Japan Air Lines
(JAL) Boeing 747-400. The departure spacing between the two aircraft complied with the
current aircraft separation requirements established by the FAA. Once airborne, a
sequence of events rapidly occurred. The airplane encountered one or more wake vortices
trailing the B-747-400 aircraft. The Pilot Flying (PF) the airplane reacted judiciously to
stabilize the attitude of the airplane in response to the vortices. Aerodynamic forces
exceeded ultimate load on the tail fin within 6.5 seconds, causing the vertical stabilizer to
separate from the aircraft. Twelve seconds later, the aircraft impacted the ground killing
all onboard. The horrific accident happened in less than 90 seconds on a clear morning
with no significant weather. The aviation community was left to investigate an event that
had never happened to a U.S. transport aircraft: the separation of a major component
from an airplane structure.
To understand the separation of the vertical stabilizer, accident investigators began to
look at a number of variables, chiefly:
· Aircraft design, certification, and modification, concentrating on the flight
control design and the composite structure
· Other in-service events of A-300 aircraft
· Pilot behavior and decision making
· Pilot interaction with the aircraft, including adverse Aircraft Pilot
Coupling (APC)
· Aircraft separation spacing
· Effects of wake vortices on trailing aircraft
The discovery process uncovered ten prior in-service events concerning A-300 aircraft,
beginning with an Interflug Airlines event in 1991. In all ten events, the vertical
stabilizers of each Airbus aircraft were exposed to excessive aerodynamic loads—three
even exceeding ultimate load (United States 2003 (Public Hearing Exhibit 7Q). When the
manufacturer observed these highly unusual in- flight events, Airbus should have
investigated the flaws in the design as the limit load is the maximum load expected when
the aircraft is in service. Ultimate load is defined as the limit load multiplied by a safety
2
factor of 150%.1 The manufacturer failed to correlate the deficiencies obvious in the inflight
events and placed blame on other parties. It is the manufacturer’s responsibility to
assess whether a deficiency exists and, if so, to determine the commensurate need for a
mitigating strategy to prevent a catastrophe. Furthermore, according to the Bilateral
Aviation Safety Agreement (May 1996), Airbus should have disseminated critical
information as a function of their monitoring of in-service aircraft. Yet, throughout the
ten-year span of in-service events, Airbus inexplicably failed to issue any Airworthiness
Directives (ADs), Immediate Action Bulletins, Technical Bulletins, Flight Crew
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