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DC-10 6.50 .255
MD-11 6.50 .273
MD-90 3.25 .288
B-717 3.25 .289
A-300-600R 1.45 .93
(Official Docket Aircraft Performance Report 12)
9
The change in maximum force and degrees of rudder per pound between the A300B2/B4
and the A300-600 is highly significant. The A300 family has the distinction of having the
lightest breakout force and the highest number of degrees of rudder travel per pound of
force of any other transport category aircraft. Once a pilot initiates rudder movement, he
or she will be challenged with the most sensitive rudder handling qualities of any
transport category airplane. This sensitivity is a precursor to a characteristic known as
Aircraft Pilot Coupling (APC), a condition typically “…not feasible for a pilot to realize
and react to in real time,” and considered unacceptable in U.S. certified designs
(National Research Council 15). Simply, a very light application of force coupled with a
very small movement of the rudder pedal will yield full deflection of the rudder.
“Artificial trim and feel systems which produce controllers with too small a displacement
and light force gradients may also lead to severe overcontrol.”
FAA Advisory Circular 25-7A
“Good flying qualities are fundamental to the elimination of adverse APC. These are
defined in the form of requirements with relevant metrics to be satisfied (8).”
National Research Council
The reason for such a significant design difference between these two variants of the
A300 has not been determined. Airbus has not produced a quantitative methodology,
such as the FAA’s Handling Qualities Rating Method (HQRM) or Cooper-Harper tests,
to demonstrate how they evaluated the handling qualities of the variant airplane. Mr.
Jacob, Airbus test pilot, could only explain their methodology at the NTSB Public
Hearing as, “We qualify it to—we check it—we—and that means test pilots from
manufacturers and from the certification authorities—qualify the suitability of the
aircraft” (540). That statement bears no similarity to the requirements of 14 CFR Part 25.
Safety Recommendation 1
The NTSB should recommend that the FAA require evaluation of all
aircraft operating under U.S. type certification by FAA Handling
Qualities Rating Method (HQRM) or equivalent.
10
Safety Recommendation 2
The NTSB should recommend that the FAA and French DGAC form
an Engineering Evaluation Team to work with Airbus and the
operators of the A310/A300-600 to determine whether pilot training
alone is an adequate remedy to the undesirable Flight Co ntrol System
(FCS) characteristics of these aircraft, or if an FCS modification is
also required.
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B. FLIGHT ENVIRONMENT
“Wake turbulence accidents and incidents have been, and continue to be, a significant
contribution to the worldwide safety statistics” (1-1).
Wake Turbulence Training Aid
The encounter of AA 587 with the wake vortices of the preceding aircraft, a Boeing 747-
400, triggered the events leading to catastrophic structural failure of the accident aircraft.
NASA engineers have analyzed the DFDR data from AA Flight 587 and JAL Flight 47,
attempting to recreate the forces of the wake vortices encountered. DFDR data confirms
that the aircraft flew normally until the encounter. Engineers were hampered in their
attempts to analyze the data by three factors (Aircraft Performance Report, 19-20, 11;
Appendix A, 19):
1) Low sampling rates of both DFDRs
2) Lack of specific data to perform force calculations
3) Ambiguous data on flight control and handling characteristics of the
A300
Additionally, they were handicapped in the DFDR analysis by a filter in the System Data
Analog Converter (SDAC) whose properties Airbus was unable to define.
AA 587’s flight path was disturbed by two potentially destructive wake vortices
generated by the Boeing 747-400 aircraft. The vortices carried the legacy of thousands of
documented and undocumented wake turbulence incidents and accidents. Wake
turbulence issues have been clouded by economic influences, particularly airport
capacity. The most direct fix of this problem is to increase separation. This is also the
most opposed solution due to its economic impact. It is time for safety and science to
override economics.
The existence and destructive potential of wake turbulence is more than adequately
substantiated throughout the history of turbojet transport aircraft operations. The
phenomenon has been the subject of study by U.S. and international regulatory agencies,
accident prevention and investigation authorities, and private aviation safety
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