曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
safety. This recommendation resulted from the 1994 Roselawn,
Indiana, accident and now directly applies to this accident. The
recommendation states, “Establish policies and procedures to ensure
that all pertinent information is received, including the
manufacturer’s analysis of incidents, accidents or other airworthiness
issues, from the exporting country’s airworthiness authority so that
the FAA can monitor and ensure the continued airworthiness of
airplanes certified under the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement.”
28
Safety Recommendation 11
The NTSB should recommend the various governmental agencies
responsible for the bilateral agreements which allow foreign
manufacturers to qualify for U.S. certification form a team to review
the aircraft certification process. Emphasis should be placed on
ensuring that the standards of 14 CFR Part 25 are met fully prior to
certification consideration.
29
4. SUMMATION
Airbus designed and produced the A300B2-1A in 1971. Eleven years later, Airbus
redesigned the rudder control unit in a new model called the A300B4-600. This unique
design dramatically changed the handling characteristics of the airplane. Airbus did not
rely on a verifiable test process to identify any undesirable flight control characteristics
when modifying the rudder system. After ten years of in-service high- load events, Airbus
had knowledge that there may be a flaw in the A300. They then had a chance to fix the
flaw before it resulted in a catastrophic event.
Contrary to the BASA, Airbus chose not to inform the aviation industry of this flaw. In
fact, Airbus published guidance encouraging use of “whatever authority is required of the
flight controls” (Dempster 12). They withheld information from the aviation community
when, after participating in a full NTSB investigatio n, they failed to inform American
Airlines and the NTSB that airplane N90070 had exceeded ultimate load in a 1997 event.
That airplane continued to fly with a damaged tail until it was replaced in late 2002.
Airbus had five years in which to notify the NTSB, FAA, DGAC, or American Airlines
of the flaw but chose not to inform anyone until this accident forced the disclosure.
The pilots operating the accident airplane were highly-skilled, fully-qualified, proficient
aviators who were never informed of the unusual limitations of their airplane. They were
trained in an FAA-approved training program though the FAA misinformed them that
they could use full authority of the flight controls below maneuvering speed (Va). The
pilots took off with the FAA-established minimum wake turbulence separation distances.
Unbeknownst to them, those distances were based upon conjecture and outdated data.
When the pilots encountered a wake vortex of unknown strength, they applied flight
controls which were appropriate for their situation. While they did not exceed any
limitations, violate any procedures, or perform unusually in any manner, their aircraft
suffered catastrophic structural failure.
30
WORKS CITED
Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid. Monteil, Christian. Letter. France. Airbus
Industrie, 1998.
Dempster, Denis, and Leslie Nichols, eds. Aerodynamic Principles of Large-Airplane
Upsets. Spec. issue of Airbus Technical Digest (June 1998).
National Research Council. Aviation Safety and Pilot Control: Understanding and
Preventing Unfavorable Pilot-Vehicle Interactions. Washington. National
Academy Press, 1997.
United States. National Transportation Safety Board. Official Docket 32764 on American
Airlines Flight 587 Accident NTSB Identification: DCA02MA001. Washington.
GPO, 2002.
---. ---. Public Hearing on American Airlines Flight 587 Accident NTSB Identification:
DCA02MA001.Washington. GPO, 2003.
---. Federal Aviation Administration. System Safety Handbook. Washington. GPO, 2000.
---. National Archives and Records Administration. Code of Federal Regulations.
Washington. GPO, 2004.
Wake Turbulence Training Aid. Washington. GPO, 1995.
31
LIST OF SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The NTSB should recommend that the FAA require evaluation of all aircraft
operating under U.S. type certification by FAA Handling Qualities Rating Method
(HQRM) or equivalent.
2. The NTSB should recommend that the FAA and French DGAC form an Engineering
Evaluation Team to work with Airbus and the operators of the A310/A300-600 to
determine whether pilot training alone is an adequate remedy to the undesirable Flight
Control System (FCS) characteristics of these aircraft, or if an FCS modification is
also required.
3. The NTSB should recommend that the FAA reexamine the validity of current ATC
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