曝光台 注意防骗
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to me that they would be practicing so soon. Much to my
surprise, they were. I was [in Special Use Airspace] where
I should not have been. From this incident I learned never
to take anything for granted in flying. You can never
think things will be business as usual. I should have
called the FSS before leaving the hangar. I did not. I
should have called in the air. I did not. I should have
turned on the XXX ATIS. I did not.
What took place could have been avoided if I had taken
the time to do what I have always done. On this flight I
got complacent and it bit me. I guarantee it will never
happen again.
The ASRS database contains numerous reports of
incidents that occurred when complacency caught
someone off guard. The private pilot who submitted this
report fell into the complacency trap once, but... “never
again.”
Caught by Complacency
A passenger informed me that her husband was
not feeling well. I immediately ran to him to find him
upright in his seat but unresponsive to any verbal
commands... I laid him down [and] his wife
informed me that he had taken a sleeping pill. At
this point I believed that was the problem, but then
he began to have tremors. I had the defibrillator and
oxygen brought to me. No shock was advised. Two
physicians answered our page and came
immediately. The enhanced medical kit was used.
Doctors started an IV and advised us to land as soon
as possible. Two doctors, two nurses, and two flight
attendants worked continually with the passenger
throughout the landing and until paramedics took
over.
I advise getting medical equipment even if the
situation does not appear to warrant it. This
situation changed rapidly.
Handling an in-flight medical emergency
can be a stressful and disruptive
procedure. In this report, a cool-headed,
quick-thinking Flight Attendant
demonstrated how to do it right.
runway... The First Officer was a
Captain/Check Airman and he too was
engrossed in calling the tower and
watching the B737. He lowered the
flaps to landing before the gear was
down. I inadvertently left the speed
brakes extended and got an EICAS
warning and simultaneously realized
that I had landing flaps selected with
the gear still up. I immediately
retracted the speed brakes and called
for the gear...
Recommendation: ...revise logic so that
the gear warning sounds immediately upon selecting landing
flaps with gear handle up or neutral, regardless of altitude
or airspeed.
The preoccupation with the traffic...and late descent acted
as distractions... We had two cockpit jump-seat pilots who
also were watching for traffic. I will never again get so
preoccupied.
Care in the Air
The Slam-Dunk — a “Preoccupational” Hazard
CCAALLLLBBAACCKK From NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System
Number 281 February 2003
A Monthly Safety Bulletin
from
The Office of the NASA
Aviation Safety Reporting
System,
P.O. Box 189,
Moffett Field, CA
94035-0189
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
January 2003 Report Intake
Air Carrier / Air Taxi Pilots 2053
General Aviation Pilots 583
Controllers 17
Cabin/Mechanics/Military/Other 129
TOTAL 2782
FMC - Getting Along with the Program
The benefits of
cockpit automation
in the
operation of
complex aircraft
have been well
established.
However, incidents
continue
to occur in which flight crew management of one or
more aspects of the automated system is implicated.
NASA/ASRS receives several reports each day
on anomalies associated with the Flight Management
Computer (FMC). The majority of these involve
flight crew programming errors or a lack of
familiarity with FMC response to certain inputs. In
an effort to increase awareness of these errors, all
of the reports discussed in this issue of Callback
are related to the most common FMC problems
reported to ASRS.
First, Make Comparisons
This B737-800 crew detailed the consequences of failing to
compare the flight plan route with the FMC Legs Page(s)
data. Their experience was typical of many incidents
reported to ASRS in which fixes either were not entered,
or were “dropped” by the computer.
[We] departed XXX on the RNAV Departure. After flying
over INTXN-1, we started to fly directly to INTXN-3. We
failed to fly over INTXN-2, or the ABC VOR. It wasn’t
until Center informed us, that we realized we were off
course ...and it took us a couple of minutes to figure out
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