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时间:2010-07-02 13:34来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:admin
曝光台 注意防骗 网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者

smudge was beginning to show relief and was actually
rising above the runway surface. At about the VR call, I
determined that the black smudge was a large debris field
from a total tire failure perhaps 1000-1500 feet in front of
us. The First Officer had just commenced a normal rotation
and I was concerned that we may impact the debris, so
I applied a little extra back pressure on the yoke and
commented that I was ‘coming on it a little.’ With a slightly
higher than normal rotation rate, we became airborne
about 500-1000 feet prior to the debris. Tower was notified
as was the preceding aircraft...
As we flew over the debris, I noted that what I had initially
seen was the entire outer tread of a large aircraft tire.
There was also significant tire debris scattered all around
the general area...Impact at high speed (rotation) would
have almost certainly led to severe or catastrophic damage
to our aircraft...I think the HGS and my scan through it for
V-speeds greatly assisted in earlier recognition and better
reaction time. The First Officer...did not see the debris until
I began assisting with the rotation.
Best Performance by a Duo
on a Night Flight
A CFI and a student on a night IFR flight kept their
cool, even when conditions in the cockpit heated up.
First Down
Second Down
Third Down
Number 327 March 2007
Those who are suffering withdrawal from the
football season will be cheered up to realize that the
movement of aircraft across an airport’s surface is
not unlike a football game. ATC is the “quarterback”
and calls the plays. The “line” is composed of
aircraft taxiing, holding, taking off, and landing.
The “snap” occurs when ATC issues a “cleared to”
instruction. When all goes well, aircraft move in a
well-sequenced and predictable choreography. But
when communications break down, safety incidents
are often the result.
This month we look at incidents reported to ASRS
that involve aircraft (or vehicles) “in motion”
erroneously. Our incident selection includes
runway incursions, a wrong direction takeoff, a taxi
without clearance, a takeoff without clearance, and
a “cops and robbers” airport chase.
In most of these events, better radio technique,
stronger checklist discipline, and enhanced
situational awareness might have prevented these
incidents from occurring.
—Encroachment
Although an air carrier crew showed laudable caution in
trying to confirm a clearance to take the runway, accepting
the clearance without hearing a call sign tripped them up.
■ We were on Taxiway B enroute to Runway 28R. We were
#1 for that runway, and no other aircraft [were] around.
We completed the Before Takeoff checklist then switched to
Tower control as we approached the end of the runway. We
heard Tower say a call sign (which we thought was ours)
‘cleared for takeoff.’ Because we had just switched over, and
the transmission seemed a little garbled, the First Officer
said confirm company number cleared for takeoff Runway
28R. Then we heard an ‘affirmative.’ We continued around
the corner into position on the runway, but didn’t quite
have a warm and fuzzy [feeling], since we didn’t hear the
controller repeat our call sign when we were confirming our
takeoff clearance. So we stopped at the normal position and
hold area on the runway, and asked Tower please confirm
company number cleared for takeoff. Then the controller
stated ‘negative,’ you are not even cleared to be on the
runway. We taxied clear immediately...
The Tower controller was apparently working two separate
frequencies and had cleared someone on the other side
of the airport for takeoff. The ‘affirmative’ the controller
gave...was for another aircraft on the other frequency...The
lesson learned...is that...we should have gotten [ATC] to say
our call sign and repeat the clearance before crossing the
hold short line. Fortunately final was clear and there were
no other aircraft around and no conflicts.
—Offside
After multiple tests and inspections of a B737-300 at the
gate, maintenance technicians were unable to duplicate
a takeoff warning horn fault. The technicians asked ATC
for permission to do a “power run” on an inactive runway,
in an attempt to duplicate the condition the pilots had
experienced.
■ ...We were told that we could use the inactive runway
(my understanding). We taxied to the runway and I
advanced throttles past 33% (to activate the takeoff
 
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