曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
Fred Lohden is a triple-threat
aviator–a former Navy pilot, a
retired UAL Captain, and a charter
pilot for a Northern California
company. Fred joined the ASRS
staff in 2003 as an Aviation
Safety Analyst, and has applied
his diverse flying background to
analysis of air carrier, corporate,
and General Aviation reports.
Fred spent 21 years as a Naval Aviator, serving in Vietnam
and retiring as a Commander. He was a Captain with
United Airlines for 20 years, and flew the B737, B757,
B767, B747-400, and A320 aircraft before retiring in 2002.
In addition to his report analysis work at ASRS, Fred is an
active charter pilot, a job that keeps his flying skills honed.
He also enjoys sailing, woodworking, and model trains.
Our “Interrupted Checklists” feature continues with
three General Aviation reports. In the following
incidents, pilots might have avoided mishaps when
interrupted by (1) resuming the checklist from the
“Hold” point, or (2) starting checklists over again.
Checklist Interrupted–
Damaged Rotor Hubs
A Training Captain describes how a helicopter “fam ride”
went awry after a preflight inspection was interrupted:
■ …While on a training flight, the right side transmission
cover for a Eurocopter AS355-FL Twin Star departed the
aircraft while inflight in the traffic pattern…The flight
was a familiarization flight with a prospective new hire.
During the preflight inspection, I (Training Captain) was
called away from the aircraft to assist our mechanics with
the lifting and turning of a transmission from another
helicopter. I then returned and moved another ship out of
the way so that the training aircraft could be towed out of
the hangar to the flight line. The aircraft was started and
[a variety of] maneuvers were performed…After entering
a left downwind to Runway 27…I felt something hit the
aircraft, which caused a momentary shuddering. I took
control of the aircraft and notified ops that I believed I had
suffered a bird strike...
Inspection revealed that the right side transmission cover
had departed the aircraft…I can only guess that I undid
the latches and was called away and then failed to close
them, or that I did not close them properly. I can only offer
as a cause, the fact that I allowed myself to be taken away
from a preflight and after having done so, not go back and
start the preflight all over again…
The First Officer’s report added: During the postflight
inspection, it was discovered that damage to the 3 main
rotor hubs was sustained.
Checklist Interrupted–Fuel Starvation
A Cessna 310 pilot with one eye on an approaching
weather system tried to repeat the Pre-Descent
Checklist several times–but was interrupted by multiple
distractions.
■ …It was a busy time, as I was assigned a STAR that
I had to study…and was having trouble picking up the
weather. I tried to run my Pre-Descent Checklist 3-4 times,
but was interrupted by traffic on the TCAS, or controller
descent instructions. As I was being vectored onto the final
approach course, I hit a wall of heavy rain and began to
lose the right engine at that time. I assumed it was the rain
that was killing the engine (wrong!) and began trying to
diagnose the problem and control the airplane at the same
time. At this time I reported the problem to the controller.
The rain and wind were fairly strong…and kept me from
running the Emergency checklist. About this time the
second engine failed as well and I began a steep descent
about 7-9 miles from the airport, as I established best glide.
I told the controller that I had now lost both engines, and
he told me that I would not make [airport] at the current
Number 321 September 2006
Editor’s Note: This article was stimulated by an
ASRS Aviation Safety Telecon with representatives
of FAA’s William J. Hughes Technical Center and
NASA technical representatives on the subject of
incidents involving apparent false Traffic Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts and Passenger
Electronic Devices (PEDs). At least some of these
incidents can be attributed to the failure of a
system termed the “mutual suppression bus.” Pilots
and technicians may find the information provided
here useful.
False TCAS Advisories – The Mutual
Suppression Bus
■ We were being vectored by Approach Control for an
ILS approach to Runway 17C. We were level at 5,000 feet
in IMC. A [TCAS] target appeared out of nowhere at our
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