曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
on the closeout. Takeoff roll seemed long, but not out of
the ordinary for heavy weights. Rotation was very heavy,
took more effort and time than in my past experience. On
climbout, our minimum maneuvering speed should have
been about 254 knots but was indicating 262 knots. We
thought maybe we were heavier than indicated and flew
conservatively to ZZZ1...On descent we planned for 130K
pound speeds instead of the 124K indicated. Used 137 knot
bug instead of 129 knot bug. Due to high/fast approach
profiles into ZZZ1 didn’t get much of a feel for it until
relatively close in to landing. The last 20 feet, flying around
138-142 knots, sink rate was unarrestable, [we] ran out of
elevator authority and landed firmly. Asked Operations to
perform an audit of the cargo holds upon blocking in, then
monitored the offload personally. By my math (based on
crew chief’s assessment), we had 3,960 pounds in forward,
1,870 pounds in mid, and 2,100 pounds in aft cargo. This
comes to 7,930 pounds versus release of 6,150 pounds. The
report at departure had a plan of 1,030 pounds forward,
2,423 pounds mid, and 2,600 pounds aft. This comes to
about 3,000 pounds heavy in forward, and 500 pounds
light in aft...The heavy rotation, and the lack of elevator
authority on landing, as well as the high alpha speeds
perhaps from additional tail-down force required, are
all symptoms of an incorrectly loaded aircraft, with an
incorrect Center of Gravity on closeout...
328
baggage loads, and other unanticipated changes such as
late departures. This makes the communication of timely
weight and balance information between baggage loaders
and Operations Offices crucial to safe flight. Here’s what
happened to a B737 flight that was running late:
■ ...The flight pushed back 44 minutes behind schedule.
During the engine start sequence, Operations sent the
weight and balance numbers, which were loaded into the
Flight Management Computer. On departure, the Captain,
who was the flying pilot, mentioned how sluggish the climb
was. Nineteen minutes later, Dispatch sent an ACARS
message to the crew which read, ‘Ops called with revised
numbers...’ There was a 1,500 pound difference in ZFW
[Zero Fuel Weight] and actual takeoff weight, and a shift
of 1.8 percent in the Center of Gravity...Communications
between baggage loaders and Operations need to be
improved to get reliable information relayed accurately to
Operations. Operations then has an obligation to get the
numbers calculated and passed on to the crew operating
the flight in a timely manner.
An MD-83 flight crew knew they were heavy on takeoff,
but were unprepared for the controllability problems they
experienced on landing.
Coffee Breaks
A Captain on an international flight
had just gotten up from a rest break
and poured a cup of coffee to speed
his recovery from “sleep inertia.” With
coffee cup in hand, he decided that he
might as well go up to the cockpit and
take his seat:
■ Can you guess where this story is going?
As I am getting into the just vacated left seat,
holding my just poured and still very full coffee
cup, kaboom, coffee all over the center pedestal. As we
rapidly tried to clean up the mess, the left and center audio
panels, with their multitude of mike and receive buttons,
begin to look like twinkle light Christmas trees. What we
did not know at first was that we had gone hot mike to
ATC. All of the ruckus and commotion in the cockpit was
being intermediately transmitted. Well, shades of 9-11, they
almost launched the fighters on us. We quickly got a textmessage
off to Dispatch through the Satcom having them
advise ATC of our situation. We cleaned up and sorted out
the mess and figured out that by shutting down the left
VHF (we pulled its circuit breaker) and only using the right
VHF through the right (co-pilot’s) audio panel and with
overhead speakers on, so I could listen, we could get into
[destination] OK.
Now, to the...moral of the story. Many of the reports you
publish end with a mea culpa about how they will never
make that mistake again. But we are human, so they may
not make that mistake again, but someone else will. So,
how much of the lesson is about how to handle the problem
once it begins? Back to Pilot 101 Day One: analyze the
situation, take the proper action, and land as soon as
conditions permit.
I am sure the ‘coffee’ story will get
spread around a little, and people will
be more careful with their drinks, for
a while. I hope how we handled the
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
CALL BACK 2(131)
