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before the five miles is infringed (or
implement another separation standard).
Consider now the case where the pilot
is delegated or assigned separation and
selects the same separation standard of
say five miles (but now with the pilot
being responsible). In this situation,
strategic conflict management of traffic
synchronisation using seven miles may
still apply, however, it will now be the
responsibility of the pilot, as separator,
to intervene before the five miles is
compromised (or an alternative standard
is implemented).
Cockpit displays
However, achieving this will impose
requirements on the information system’s
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information
(CDTI), the flight crew (training and
licensing) and have the specific where, when
and what of the separation mode itself.
Any system must evolve from existing
ones incorporating protocols and
operability standards. Pilots already
perform self-separation, outside controlled
airspace as well as delegated separation
inside controlled airspace. In some
“It is not acceptable for one aircraft to avoid the other by
flying into another hazard (such as weather or incompatible
airspace activity)”
Patrik Peters
Executive Vice-President Europe, IFATCA
34
EUROCONTROL / IFATCA 2008: a collaborative approach to the future > Designing the network
35
countries, that can be mostly visual
separation. Evolution from current pilot
and controller procedures will ensure a
safe and orderly transition. This does not
preclude changes but, rather, requires an
evolutionary process in which a series of
steps are taken to a target state, never
ignoring what has been learned and never
changing for the sake of it.
Some of the more difficult issues affect
CDTI and a number of issues need to be
addressed. There are, perhaps, four layers,
or groups, of CDTI applications:
1. General awareness traffic information.
This assists the flight crew with
situational awareness of traffic
information but does not require them
to act on this information.
2. Trajectory dependent traffic
information. This requires the flight
crew to base their aircraft’s trajectory on
another aircraft’s trajectory. This is not
separation-based. For example, traffic
synchronisation (following, merging,
spacing) to comply with an air traffic
control instruction.
3. Separation traffic information, this
information only being used by the
flight crew to separate their aircraft
from the traffic.
4. Collision avoidance traffic information.
Each of these layers has different
requirements on the information
displayed. For layers two and three above,
even basic issues, such as how to label the
target, need addressing. For example, a
controller’s radar display uses labels that
have the airline operating company as a
code together with the flight number. The
controllers then know the radio call sign
for the operator and so can make
transmissions to the aircraft, relay
identification and coordinate with other
controllers. A major issue is, therefore,
that pilots are not going to know all the
operator codes and call signs. Moreover,
will all the displayed information be
legible in a cockpit?
Additionally, how is information to be
relayed from the controller to the pilot?
Some controller systems have electronic
pointers. What verification systems,
common to controller radar systems, are
required for the CDTI in layers two and
three? What CDTI functions, for example,
equivalents to controller bearing and range
line, alerts and warnings will the pilot
need? And, even more problematic, what
systems must be established to ensure that
two or more separators (different pilots or
combination of pilots and controllers) see
the same identification? The maritime
example of ‘radar-assisted collisions’ results
from inadequate display systems for the
task at hand. It must not be repeated in
commercial aviation.
Criteria for a solution must take into
account that there must be only one
separator for a given hazard at any one
time. Separation must be delegated, but
only temporarily. Separation provision is
not independent of other ATM
requirements and there must be predefined
procedures, including emergency
procedures incorporating all available
trajectory change options.
A safe ATM system is one in which the
chosen separator for a conflict (be it
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