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时间:2011-08-28 16:23来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:航空
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18.2  If a failure of a sub-system occurs, the remote control and monitoring system or the manual reporting system shall record a hard copy of the event (501). It shall indicate, where possible, the cause of the event (502).
18.3  The RCMS information required depends on the configuration, and the ATS providers intention to provide service in reduced redundancy. However, the following minimum information shall be available:
a) An indication of present operating configuration (503).
b) An indication of unavailable sub-systems (504).
18.4  The RCMS shall enable the operator to select the correct course of action. The intended operating procedures shall be submitted for approval (505).
18.5  Any configuration changes undertaken by remote control shall not conflict with local control (506).
19  Reliability
19.1  General
19.1.1  The reliability of the radar sensor as appropriate to the OR shall be justified (507).
19.1.2  The expected reliability either from theoretical analysis or a practical trial shall be demonstrated (508). This reliability assessment shall extend to the power supplies and landlines (509). The reliability analysis shall be combined with a hazard analysis to produce a functionally based reliability analysis (510).
19.1.3  The reliability assessment shall state the method chosen and the chosen environment (511).
20  Mean Time to Repair (MTTR)
20.1  The mean time to repair shall be specified and justifiably appropriate to the OR (512).
20.2  Recommendation: Mean time to repair of 1 hr (513).
20.3  When operating in reduced redundancy the system provider shall show that adequate safety mechanisms exist (514), including: a) Equipment identifies that no standby is available (515). b) Maintenance procedures identify the priority for repair that must occur (516).
c) Operating procedures identify the smooth transition to another service type in the case of loss of remaining equipment (517).
20.4  The documentation and skills/training necessary to achieve repair times shall be defined (518).
20.5 The maximum time taken to establish full operating conditions following a power supply interruption shall be justified (519).

Figure 1 Accuracy Distribution and the Target Level of Safety

Figure 2 SRA Vertical Coverage
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SUR 04  SSR External Monitor Engineering Requirements
Part 1 Preliminary Material
1 Introduction
An external SSR monitor may be required for range and accuracy checking of the SSR transmissions, as determined by ICAO Annex 10 Vol. IV, Chapter 3 Section 3.1.1.10 (521).
2 Scope
This document sets out the required functions, positioning and operating conditions of SSR external monitoring equipment.
Part 2 Requirements
3  Safety Objective
The external monitor shall provide accurate reference information to test the transmission, reception and decoding characteristics of the SSR service in conjunction with the range and azimuth accuracy of the ground interrogator (1710).
4  Functional Requirements
4.1  If the SSR service is to be used without a primary radar, an external site monitor shall be provided (522).
4.2  The external monitoring equipment shall continuously monitor those radar parameters which affect detection performance, accuracy or resolution (523). NOTE: This includes parameters such as the following: a) Target bearing. b) Target range. c) Peak power.
d) Side Lobe Suppression.
e) Pulse spacing.

5  Siting Requirements
5.1  The positioning of the SSR monitor will depend on the use of the equipment.
5.1.1  Recommendation: Where the controller uses the monitor to assess collimation errors the monitor should be sited within the range that the ATS operators can view. The bearing chosen should correspond to an area of airspace commensurate with the operational situation; the position should not conflict with operationally sensitive areas (524).
 
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本文链接地址:CAP 670 Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements 2(87)