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时间:2011-08-28 16:23来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:航空
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4.3  DDS for operational use by controllers should be easily visible from relevant control positions (212). The display should be clear and free from reflections (213). Systems should not divert the attention of controllers at operational positions unless specifically designed to do so (214).
5  Flight data display
Flight data displays (such as flight progress strip boards or pinboards) are to be provided (204). Approval may be given for shared displays (for example where two radar controllers work side by side with the data display between them).
6  Flight Data Processing (FDP) and Electronic Flight Progress Strips (EFPS) Systems
6.1  The following text includes salient points derived and interpreted from the relevant EC Regulations. To ensure full compliance with these Regulations they should be read in full. Links to the source material are provided in this section. They apply to Units providing services to General Air Traffic.
6.2  Software
Software related aspects of FDP and EFPS Systems shall comply with Part B, Section 3 Regulatory Objectives for Software Safety Assurance in ATS Equipment (SW 01) (1755).
6.3  Records
FDP and EFPS systems shall comply with requirements for retention of records as detailed in CAP 493 Manual of Air Traffic Services Part 1, Section 8, Chapter 1, Page 5 and Section 6, Chapter 1, page 2 (www.caa.co.uk/cap493).
6.4  General Issues of Particular Note for FDP and EFPS Systems
It is recommended that the following issues are considered as part of the system and
safety assurance development:
NOTE: This list is not exhaustive.

.  
The provision of hand written strips arrangements as backup in case of system failure;

.  
Timely printing of flight progress strips well before aircraft boundary arrival time;

.  
Adequate training of operators in human machine interfaces including interaction with directly displayed information and lower level information that needs to be retrieved from other sources, general use of system controls, generation and handling of strips, understanding of warning messages  and particular attention to inadvertent closing of displays and processing systems (with resultant time displays to restart applications, as much as 30 seconds);

.  
Arrangements for procedural control and separation in case of FDP system failure (including TRUCE etc.);

.  
Lack of changed flight plan/routing information being promulgated to Controllers;

.  
Adequate alerting of VFR flights to all relevant ATC units, in case systems only forward IFR related data;

.  
Incorrect assumption of wake vortex category if aircraft type is not recognised to system;

.  
Two flight plans in the system for the same flight;

.  
Incorrect identification of aircraft types;

.  
Mixing of messages between aircraft relating to two aircraft messages being received or input at the same time;

.  
Planned outages or maintenance not being synchronised with unusual circumstances such as bad weather and flight delays to numerous aircraft;

.  
Inadequate Service Level Agreements with external (e.g. Airport) Authorities affecting related devices such as servers resulting in un-serviceability of systems/ links and hence a need for manual intervention; and

.  
Ability of strips to display sufficient information or provision of easy access to additional information (strip message space limited).


6.5  Flight Plans in the Pre-flight Phase
6.5.1  For ATS Units having the capability and responsibility for generating flight plans, FDP and EFPS Systems shall ensure adequate checking of data format, data conventions and accuracy and shall indicate acceptance of flight plans.
6.5.2  Such systems shall ensure adequate communications between all affected ATS Units, operators and their agents, pilots and their agents.
 
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本文链接地址:CAP 670 Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements 2(108)