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concerned. For this aeroplane the assignment of the pairs of wires 0603 and 0597 with an interchange
of colours blue/red instead of red/blue shown on a white background is effective.
After completion of the reconnection work during the night shift from 19 to 20.03.2001 a functional check
was carried out. During this check an error message on the ELAC no. 1 appeared. With the error search
a faulty connection of the bridge on the plug segment AA was found and corrected. The mentioned error
message, however, did not relate to the original complaint. Afterwards a functional and control system
check was conducted simultaneously by an aeroplane electronic technician with a B2 qualification and
an aeroplane electronic technician with a B1 qualification.
The functional check was conducted on the right hand sidestick only, although the wiring on the left side
was affected as well. The check was carried out using the “AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL“
(AMM). The following instruction had to be adhered to: “Push the FLT CTL ELAC 1 (2) pushputton
switch. – Move the side-stick around in its two axis from stop to stop”. Following the functional
check, an ELAC system test, a LAND test as well as an EFCS 182 GROUNDSCANNING with hydraulic
pressure were done and afterwards the aeroplane was cleared for operation with a “Release to
Service“.
All the accomplished work was documented in the copied “Actions“ column of the work done by the
previous morning shift.
BFU German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation
5X004-0/01 16
The action was entered into the „RELIABILITY DATA ON DEMAND“ (ROD), which serves the purpose
of recording and evaluating technical processes in the aeroplane, also under the reference
number which had been copied incorrectly from the TLB into the GLB, and consequently this complaint
and the work accomplished on the aeroplane could later not be found under the actual reference
number.
1.7 Meteorological information
The weather information (ATIS) effective for the runway 18 during the period of the serious incident
was as follows:
Wind: 070°/ 4 kt
visibility: more than 10 km
clouds: FEW 032; BKN 250
temperature/dew point: 04 °C / -04 °C
QNH: 1017; NOSIG
1.8 Aids to navigation
not applicable
1.9 Communications
not applicable
1.10 Aerodrome information
The take-off was conducted from runway “West“ at Frankfurt/Main. The concrete runway is used
only for take-offs into the direction 180°. The runway is 4000 m long with a width of 45 m.
1.11 Flight recorder
The flight data recorder concerned is a solid state flight data recorder (SSFDR) made by Loral-
Aviation-Recorders in Sarasota/Florida. Approx. 470 parameters had been recorded. The flight
data recordings were stored on a CD and sent to Braunschweig to the BFU for the purpose of
evaluation.
BFU German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation
5X004-0/01 17
The evaluation of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was waived as due to the recording duration of
30 minutes, the cockpit voice recordings of the period of the occurrence had already been overwritten.
1.12 Wreckage and impact information
not applicable
1.13 Medical and pathological information
not applicable
1.14 Fire
not applicable
1.15 Survival aspects
not applicable
BFU German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation
5X004-0/01 18
1.16 Tests and research
not applicable
1.17 Organizational and management information
1.17.1 Operator
On 31.08.1999, the operator was granted an Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) by the Luftfahrt-
Bundesamt (LBA) in accordance with JAR-OPS 1.175. One of the conditions to be met for the issuance
of the AOC was the establishment of a quality management system (QM) in accordance
with JAR-OPS 1.035. “An operator shall establish one Quality System and designate one Quality
Manager to monitor compliance with, and the adequacy of, procedures required to ensure safe operational
practices and airworthy aeroplanes.“
The operator has no maintenance organisation of its own, scheduled and unscheduled work is carried
out by an external maintenance organisation on basis of a maintenance contract.
The operator put the maintenance organisation in charge of the conduct of the repair work on this
aircraft.
Pursuant to JAR-OPS 1.900, the Quality System of the operator must comprise, among other
things, the monitoring of the proper accomplishment of all conventionary maintenance actions. This
includes also the compliance with the approved procedures.
The Luftfahrt-Bundesamt had on several occasions, last in the scope of the AOC extension, complained
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