曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
three Airbus 330-300. The head office of the airline is in Stockholm.
Scandinavian Airlines as also the other airlines has operated in a demanding environment
during the last years. The demand for travel has reduced and competition of the
low-cost companies has intensified. For cutting costs the airline has cut down flight
services and reduced personnel.
Scandinavian Airlines flight operations are performed according to SAS Flight Operations
Manual, FOM, which fulfils the OM-A requirements in JAR (Joint Aviation Requirements)
and according to SAS Flight Crew Operating Manual, FCOM, which fulfils
the OM-B requirements in JAR. The operation procedures are officially adopted by the
Scandinavian Civil Aviation Authorities.
C 9/2003 L
Airliner landing with low fuel at Helsinki-Vantaa airport on 3.10.2003
23
2 ANALYSIS
2.1 Flight planning
The flight planning was done according to the airline normal procedures. The fuel calculations
were made by the commander and the first officer using the RODOS Planning
- Longhaul Aircraft calculations. The relief pilot prepared the ETOPS-charts.
The weather on the departure airport was good as well as en route and on the planned
alternate airport Gothenburg. On the destination Arlanda the weather was good, but
there was forecasted temporarily fog and visibility 500 m on the morning between 06
and 07 UTC. The scheduled arrival time of the flight was 05.35 UTC. The pilots concluded
that no problems would be expected and agreed the 51.0 t fuel uplift. The fuel
calculations in the OFP included 0.7 t for taxi, 42.4 t trip fuel to Arlanda, 1.3 t contingency
fuel and 6.4 t minimum diversion fuel from Arlanda to Gothenburg containing alternate
trip fuel of 4.1 t and a final reserve fuel of 2.3 t. The commander received information
that take-off weight (TOW) would be 1.6 t more than the 211.3 t calculated in the
OFP and decided for that reason to take 0.2 t of extra fuel. The actual difference between
the planned and the actual TOW was 1800 kilos. The actual TOW was 213.1 t
and maximum TOW of the aircraft was 233 t.
The flight departed seven minutes behind the schedule, taxiing went normally and the
take-off fuel was 50.3 t.
2.2 Flight en route
The received flight levels were according to the flight plan and SK946 got a slight shortcut
one hour and twenty-five minutes after departure. Fuel used was more than calculated
in the OFP. 200 kg extra was burned 45 minutes after departure and after 2 h 48
min of flight time 700 kg of contingency was used. On 30 W 4 h 36 min after departure
the fuel used was 900 kg more than calculated and the flight was four minutes behind
the time calculated in OFP.
The commander had gone to rest and the first officer and the relief pilot operated the
aircraft. They told to the investigators in their interview that they were not concerned of
the fuel. According to their statements it is normal that the fuel goes below the calculations
and comes back again to the values calculated in the OFP and that the fuel quantity
indicators of A330 are not very reliable. If the fuel quantity indicators are unreliable
the fuel should be checked more closely, compare the quantity indicators to the used
fuel indicators and use a more economical cruising procedure if the fuel quantity indication
is suspected to be misleading.
The pilots flew on the planned flight level maintaining the cleared speed Mach 0.82.
Even though the flight was over the Atlantic it would have been possible to be active and
use the Optimisation and predictions ability of the FMGS. Even though the communicaC
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Airliner landing with low fuel at Helsinki-Vantaa airport on 3.10.2003
24
tions are handled via the HF -radio over the Atlantic, it is possible to request a change of
the flight level or the cruising Mach-number with a short delay.
SK946 had used by the longitude 10 W all of the contingency fuel of 1.3 t and was five
minutes behind the time calculated in the OFP. By the reporting point SOPAR the fuel
used was 1.5 ton more than calculated. After this point the pilots had marked no fuel
checks in the OFP.
The commander took his leadership lightly during cruise. He rested and did not worry
about the progress of his flight. The 500 kg of fuel which was lacking in landing on the
alternate airport would have been possible to save during the cruise if the pilots had operated
the aircraft keeping the fuel economy as goal, because the weight of the aircraft
was not heavy and a wide performance envelope was available for saving fuel. When
the fuel quantity goes below the calculated value during cruise, a good habit of action of
the pilots is to try to improve the fuel economy of the flight.
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