曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
The first officer and the relief pilot told in their interview that the contingency fuel is for an
unexpected additional fuel consumption during cruise and the purpose is not to save the
contingency fuel for the approach. During the flight in question there were no unexpected
factors, such as lower flight level or longer flight route which would have differed
from the calculation of the OFP. The fuel flow was higher than calculated during all
stages of the flight and extra fuel was needed for the approach.
2.3 Approach to Stockholm-Arlanda
When SK946 descended for the approach to Arlanda the runway visual range (RVR) on
rwy 01L was 500 m and low visibility procedures (LVP) were in force. The commander
took his position on the left cockpit seat and controls by ELTOK. The pilots requested
CAT II approach. The ATC cleared SK946 to holding, but the pilots informed that due to
fuel situation they were unable to hold and requested approach. SK946 managed to
change approach sequence with one other aircraft of the company. According to the relief
pilot’s statement it is stated in the Operations Manual of the airline that when arriving
to Arlanda during the morning peak hours the aircraft should have 15 minutes of extra
fuel. This instruction is not applicable on long-haul flights, such as SK946. According to
the pilots’ statements it is a normal procedure to change approach sequence with another
company aircraft which have a better fuel situation.
In the OFP fuel calculations of the flight SK946 the fuel at the point of 30 NM was 7.0 t.
There was also printed in the flight log part of the OFP on the next line after ELTOK abbreviation
STAR, distance of 30 NM and time 12 minutes. The pilots told that they had
7.0 t of fuel at the reporting point ELTOK. According to the aircraft FM ACTIVE POSTFLIGHT
REPORT the fuel on board by ELTOK was 7.2 t. The direct distance from ELTOK
to rwy 01L threshold is a little more than 30 NM and in a normal radar vectoring it
takes approximately 40-45 NM track miles. Thus the 30 NM, which is prescribed in RODOS
-calculations is not at ELTOK but somewhat later.
C 9/2003 L
Airliner landing with low fuel at Helsinki-Vantaa airport on 3.10.2003
25
In the RODOS OFP the line after ELTOK was misleading because the text “STAR
Stockholm/Arlanda 30….12” is possible to understand that via a standard arrival route
the flight distance to Arlanda is 30 NM and the flight time is 12 minutes. When the pilots
had calculated the estimated arrival time to Arlanda they had added to the time by ELTOK
04.51 12 minutes and had got the arrival time of 05.03. Based on these markings
the pilots had an assumption that the flight time from ELTOK to landing would be 12
minutes.
The LVP were in force and CAT II operation will reduce landing capacity to 65% according
to the AIP Sweden. CAT II operation means 7 NM spacing between arrivals
causing longer tracks for approaching traffic. The ATC applies speed restrictions and it
is not possible to fly in clean configuration until 10 NM as it is calculated in RODOS
Planning system. A CAT II approach to Arlanda requires more fuel than the planning
system calculates. The pilots should consider in flight planning which kind of approach
they may possibly have to make in the destination. Also the possible holding must be
taken into account. It is not a good airmanship to use the alternate fuel for the approach
to the destination in bad weather conditions.
The pilots told that they expected to be as number one in the approach sequence when
they had got the privilege approach without holding. The commander told that they believed
to be already on the left base leg when they got a 90 degrees right turn to the opposite
direction of the final approach. According to the FM ACTIVE POSTFLIGHT REPORT
the flight time from ELTOK to runway 01L threshold took 20 minutes when the
calculated flight time in the OFP was 12 minutes. Calculated from the flight time with an
average approach speed of 210 KT the actual distance flown by SK946 from ELTOK to
threshold 01L about 65 track miles instead of the 30 NM printed in the OFP. The approach
route of SK946 can also be seen in the figure 1.
The runway visual range on the used runway 01L was during the CAT II approach
above the landing minima 400 m and the approach was stable, but the pilots did not see
the approach or runway lights from their decision height of 165 feet measured by radio
altimeters. The commander started the missed approach procedure at 05.16 and the
pilots saw the runway lights for a moment during the missed approach. The fuel on
board was 6.1 t and the required fuel from the missed approach point to Helsinki-Vantaa
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
航空资料39(37)
