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the commander’s call out :“I can’t do anything more“ the first officer took over the controls with the words
“I have control“ and pressed the TAKE OVER PUSH BUTTON. The First Officer had already beforehand
instinctively tried to counteract the rolling movement with his sidestick.
Controlled by the second autopilot the aeroplane climbed to flight level FL 120 where the crew cautiously
analysed the control system. With an input on the left sidestick the aeroplane - after a short shaking and a
brief bank angle corresponding to the input - suddenly reacted contrary. The right-hand sidestick
functioned normally.
The crew decided to not continue the flight but to return to Frankfurt. The First Officer took over the
controls and safely landed the aeroplane in Frankfurt. The aeroplane was than handed over to the
maintenance organisation.
Prior to this flight, the aeroplane had already been at the maintenance organisation for two days for repair
purposes. On several previously conducted flights had problems occured on one of the two elevator
aileron computers (ELAC), which control, among other things, the bank angle. When the computer was
replaced, a bent pin, which could not be repaired, was found on the plug of the ELAC no. 1. Therefore the
whole plug of the ELAC no. 1 was replaced and rewired. Two pairs of wires were connected inverted, the
Command Channel and the Monitor Channel.
The BFU has come to the conclusion that the serious incident is due to the fact that:
• during repair work on the plug of the Elevator Aileron Computer (ELAC) no. 1 two pairs of
wires had been connected inverted
• the error remained undetected
• the error was not recognized by the flight crew during the “FLIGHT CONTROL CHECK“.
Contributing factors were:
• an unclear and difficult to handle documentation so that a wrong wiring diagram was
used
• diversion from the manufacturer’s data by the Maintenance Support
1 Unless otherwise specified, all times are indicated in local time.
BFU German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation
5X004-0/01 5
• manufacturer’s instructions which are not formulated unambiguously
• functional check by the cross checking staff member was carried out incorrectly
• iinsufficient functioning of the quality assurance
• the lack of supervision of the maintenance organisation by the operator
• a quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient supervision of the maintenance organisation
and the operator by the supervising authority.
• deficiencies in the “AFTER START CHECKLIST“ for the conduct of the “FLIGHT
CONTROL CHECK“.
BFU German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation
5X004-0/01 6
1. Factual information
1.1 History of the flight
In Frankfurt the crew performed a scheduled aircraft change. For the crew it was already the third
flight whereas the aeroplane was to be used for the first time that day following repair work.
Approx. 50 minutes prior to departure the crew was at the aeroplane. In the “TECHNICAL
LOGBOOK“ (TLB) all complaints entered had been checked off as settled. The aeroplane had
been released for the flight in accordance with the regulations by a “RELEASE TO SERVICE“.
The preparations for the flight were completed on time. After the power plants had been started,
prior to taxiing to runway 18, the “FLIGHT CONTROL CHECK“ was conducted by means of the
“AFTER START CHECKLIST“. According to the statements of the crew, this check was accomplished
pursuant to the valid procedures. During the check no irrecularities were found.
The aeroplane taxied via taxiway “N-South“ to the take-off position of runway 18. During the takeoff
run no abnormalities were found. During rotation the pilot-in-command noticed an increasing
bank angle to the left. He tried to correct the bank angle through an opposite input on the left
sidestick, but it grew increasingly larger.
The First Officer reported that he instinctively made an input to the right on his sidestick, which prevented
the bank angle from increasing even further, but did not lead to an improvement of the
situation. Only after he had pressed the “TAKE OVER PUSH BUTTON“ on his sidestick, he regained
full control of the aeroplane and was in a position to restore the normal flight attitude. He
switched on the autopilot no. 2 and had the aeroplane climb to flight level 120. At FL 120, the crew
cautiously checked the behaviour of the aeroplane control system.
The autopilot no. 2 was switched off and the First Officer checked the aeroplane control system
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