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时间:2011-03-20 20:51来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:admin
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 Vc Monitoring Principle
 Figure 006
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 The three sources are compared two by two. When a source is involved in the tripping of comparators (OWN source and source 3, OWN source and OPPOSITE source, source 3 and OPPOSITE source), it is eliminated and the reconfiguration source can be chosen (source 3). This result is sent to the monitoring channel to change the computation source if required. At the second failure : the gains which depend on Vc are frozen and the behaviour of the system is contingent on the type of the second failure (detected or not) (Ref. Fig. 007, 008, 009)
 -Yaw rate, lateral acceleration and angle-of-attack The three sources are voted in the command channel. The source which is far enough from the retained mid value is eliminated and replaced by a null value at the voter input. The result of the source elimination is used in the command and monitoring channels. In the event of a second failure, the vote principle is no longer used. Reconfigurations are shown in reconfiguration Table (Ref. Fig. 004)
 (2) Monitoring of landing gear (LGCIU) and flap/slat (SFCC) data (Ref. Fig. 010) The FACs utilize the landing gear and flap/slat data in their computations. These data are used by the FMGC. Each FAC only receives one SFCC or LGCIU source. The computer utilizes these data after validation and then transmits them. In the event of non-validation of these data, the opposite source is retained. Its information is transmitted through the bus of the opposite FAC. If no source is available, fixed values are retained and transmitted.
 (a) Data validation Connection between the FAC and the sources is accomplished through:
 -An ARINC 429 bus

 -A hard-wired discrete.
 The correct transmission of the bus is validated through a
 comparison of the same information between a specific ARINC
 boolean and the value of the hard-wired discrete.
 These values are used:

 -
For the SFCC: slats extended


 -
For the LGCIU: nosewheel compressed.
 Particular validations are also used:

 

 -Bit-by-bit check of the lever data for the SFCC
 -Check of the surface jamming for the SFCC
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 IRS Processing
 Figure 007
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 Yaw Rate and Lateral Acceleration - Monitoring Principle
 Figure 008

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 Angle-of-Attack - Monitoring Principle
 Figure 009
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 SFCC and LGCIU - Principle of Acquisition
 Figure 010
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 -Check of consistency between the landing gears for the LGCIU.
 (b) Fixed values In case of total lack of data, these values are retained:
 -
position Full in landing gear extended configuration (dual SFCC failure)

 -
position 0/0 in landing gear retracted configuration (dual SFCC failure)

 -
position in landing gear retracted configuration (dual LGCIU failure).


 (3) Specific monitoring of FMGCs and ELACs The FMGCs and the ELACs generate the deflection orders which will be accomplished by the FAC. Particular monitoring functions are integrated to ensure that the slaving is active.
 (a)
 FMGC:

 -Check for correct reception of the AP-engaged signals
 -Transmission to the FMGC of a signal which indicates that the FAC no longer executes automatic orders (AUTO MODE signal by boolean). This signal disconnects the AP.

 (b)
 ELAC:


 -Transmission to the ELAC of a hard-wired discrete signal (YAW IN NORMAL LAW) which indicates the correct execution of the order. This order serves to switch the ELAC to the roll direct law as necessary.
 -Change to the alternate law controlled only by the ELAC to ensure synchronism of operation with the SEC (Spoiler Elevator Computer).
 D. Monitoring of Internal Power Supplies (Ref. Fig. 011) Each processor has an independent power supply which delivers the +5V, -15V and +15V and the emergency voltages for the safeguards. Each processor monitors the normal voltages in a cross pattern. This ensures detection of 5 or 15V power-variation greater than 5 % for more than 0.5 second. To this end, the algebraic sum of the power supplies is acquired and compared to an expected value stored in memory. Beyond the defined threshold the internal monitoring is activated.
 
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