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时间:2010-09-07 00:42来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:admin
曝光台 注意防骗 网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者

costs. According to the rule of thumb, used by the airline, about a quarter of an extra fuel
uplift is used for carrying that extra fuel from Chicago to Arlanda. With good flight planning
and effective use of the aircraft and its equipment the optimal fuel economy is possible
to reach without hampering the flight safety.

C 9/2003 L
Airliner landing with low fuel at Helsinki-Vantaa airport on 3.10.2003
31
3 CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Findings
1. The pilots held valid licences and ratings required by their duties.
2. The air traffic controllers held valid licences and ratings.
3. The airworthiness certificate of the aircraft was valid.
4. The commander decided to take 200 kg extra fuel due to 1.6 t higher zero fuel
weight.
5. The take off weight of the aircraft was 1.8 t more than calculated in the operational
flight plan (OFP).
6. The fuel consumption of SK946 was during cruise higher than calculated in the
OFP. All contingency fuel of 1.3 t and the extra fuel of 0.2 t was used by reporting
point SOPAR 6 hours and 28 minutes after departure.
7. In the destination airport Arlanda low visibility procedures (LVP) were in force.
8. The commander requested category II (CAT II) approach. The weather minima for
CAT II approach was RVR 400 m.
9. When the flight SK946 entered Stockholm terminal control area (TMA), the air traffic
control (ATC) cleared it to holding, but the commander reported that SK946 had
no time for holding due to the fuel situation and requested radar vectoring for approach.
10. The Local Operation Centre of the airline helped SK946 to change approach sequence
with an other aircraft of the same company. The procedure is not according
to the ICAO recommendations.
11. The pilots had the impression that SK946 would get a privilege to all other traffic
and would obtain a short vectoring for approach.
12. The pilots supposed that they would have a flight time of 12 minutes from ELTOK
to runway 01L threshold but in the radar vectoring they had to fly 20 minutes and
approximately 65 track miles.
13. In a radar vectoring for CAT II approach the minimum track distance from ELTOK
to threshold 01L is about 45 NM.
14. The ATC reported that SK946 received a normal treatment in the traffic.
15. The calculation basis for a flight from a point 30 NM to the threshold of the landing
runway are described in FOM of Scandinavian Airlines in the part RODOS Planning
C 9/2003 L
Airliner landing with low fuel at Helsinki-Vantaa airport on 3.10.2003
32
- Longhaul Aircraft. Calculations are based on a clean aircraft to 10 NM and the aircraft
in landing configuration after that. This kind of a flight profile is possible in a
good weather and low traffic flow, but in low visibility and/or intense traffic extra fuel
should be taken for longer and slower approach.
16. The pilots noticed during approach that in case of a missed approach they would
not have enough fuel to fly to the planned alternate airport Gothenburg. They
changed the alternate to Helsinki-Vantaa, because 400 kg less fuel was required
according to the OFP calculations for a flight to Helsinki-Vantaa compared to Gothenburg.
17. The CAT II approach was stable but the pilots did not get approach or runway lights
in sight on the minimum decision height (DH) of 165 feet.
18. The commander made a missed approach and the first officer requested an ATC
clearance to Helsinki-Vantaa.
19. The remaining fuel at the missed approach point was 6.1 t. The calculated required
fuel from the missed approach point to Helsinki-Vantaa was 6.0 t including an alternate
trip fuel of 3.7 t and a final reserve fuel of 2.3 t.
20. The pilots realised on cruising level that they would not have the required final reserve
fuel upon landing in Helsinki-Vantaa and reported it to the Tampere Area
Control Centre.
21. The ATC issued SK946 a direct route clearance and free flight profile inbound Helsinki-
Vantaa runway 15.
22. The ATC gave a full alarm to the rescue services.
23. SK946 landed uneventfully. The remaining fuel was 1.8 t instead of the required final
reserve fuel of 2.3 t.
24. SK946 had used 4.3 t of fuel from the missed approach in Arlanda to the landing in
Helsinki-Vantaa when the calculated fuel consumption was 3.7 t. The fuel consumption
was about 16% higher than calculated.
25. The alternate fuel calculations of the flight SK946 should be checked because
SK946 flew a shorter flight path than stated in the calculation basis and used more
fuel than calculated.
26. The total fuel consumption or the remaining block fuel was not marked in the 34 researched
OPFs. The last fuel check was marked 45 minutes to 2 h 32 min before
 
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