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inputs by the crew. The movements of the sidesticks are transformed into electrical signals and are
transmitted to the corresponding computers. Generally the sidestick being moved out of its neutral
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position has priority. If both sidesticks are moved simultaneously, the signals of both sidesticks are
added up with the resulting signal being limited by the maximum travel of one individual sidestick.
If one pilot wishes to take over control he will have to press the "TAKE OVER PUSH BUTTON" on his
sidestick. If he releases the button within 30 seconds, both sidesticks are equal in priority again and
the control signals of both sidesticks will be added up again. If he holds the push button pressed for
more than 30 seconds, his sidestick gets priority and at the same time a green light will light up on the
instrument panel in front of him whereas on the other side a red light will light up. This priority can be
neutralized only by pressing the "TAKE OVER PUSH BUTTON" on the other side.
1.6.1 Case History
Already on 17 March 2001 in Hamburg, ELAC no. 2 failed and was then replaced by a new one. All
tests conducted afterwards showed a proper function.
A second error message of the ELAC no. 2 appeared on 18 March 2001 at Frankfurt during taxiing. By
briefly pulling the circuit breakers of the ELAC no. 2 the crew made a “RESET“ after which no further
error message appeared.
A further error message of ELAC no. 2 appeared in the evening of 18 March 2001 at Moscow Airport,
when the powerplants were started. The aeroplane was parked again and engine shut down. As a
corrective action ELAC no. 1 and ELAC no. 2 were interchanged. The defect, however, persisted on
position 2. Therefore the corresponding circuit breakers were pulled pursuant to the "OPERATIONAL
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE" (OMP) and in accordance with the "MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST"
(MEL) so that the defect was now on position 1. The return flight was conducted in accordance with
the MEL with a functioning ELAC no. 2.
The complaint was entered by the crew into the "TECHNICAL LOGBOOK". At the same day, on
18.03.2001, the aeroplane was delivered to the maintenance organisation in Frankfurt.
1.6.2 Repair
When the aeroplane was taken over from flight operations, the complaint “failure of the ELAC no. 2“,
which the crew had entered into the aeroplane’s Technical Logbook, was erroneously transferred by a
maintenance staff member under an incorrect number into the "GROUND LOGBOOK"(GLB).
During the error search, which was accomplished during the night shift from 18th to 19th March 2001 a
defect in the X-TALK-BUS between ELAC no. 1 and ELAC no. 2 could be localized. It was caused by
a bent connection pin (Pin 6K) in the plug segment AE of the socket for the ELAC no. 1.
The attempt to replace the connection pin without replacing the whole plug segment was not successful.
A safety spring of the connector pin had come out and could not be inserted again. Therefore it
was decided to replace the plug segment AE, but there was a problem, it was no suitable spare plug
segment for this series of airplane on stock. Consequently it was decided to replace all four plug
segments AA, AB, AD and AE. This meant that in a most confined space approx. 420 assigned
connector pins had to be reconnected. As this repair work would take a longer period of time, the
aeroplane was taken out of flight operations.
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The work started without having a Maintenance Job Order which would have been required according
to respective procedural regulations.
Location of the ELAC no. 1 in the Avionic Bay
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Rear of the plug with its four segments
It was decided to apply the “ONE TO ONE“ method, i.e. the wires were disconnected one after the
other from the old plug and immediately connected to the new one. The work started on
19.03.2001 in the morning shift with the replacement of the plug segments AA, AD und AE. The
fourth plug segment AB was replaced in the subsequent late shift. The work was accomplished by
adequately qualified aircraft electronic technicians with company internal ratings, so-called B1 and
B2 qualifications.
The designation of the positions of the individual pins on the plug segments was defined by an alphanumerical
coordinate system. The working basis was the "AIRCRAFT WIRING LIST" (AWL)
91-20-33 and the "AIRCRAFT WIRING MANUAL" (AWM) 27-92-19.
The staff members were not sure which page of the AIRCRAFT WIRING MANUAL was the effective
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