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side sticks, including momentarily opposing inputs. The Airbus A321’s side sticks are
small and since the left-seat’s side stick is on the left and the right seat’s side stick is on
the right, are also well separated. It is considered that this made it difficult for the
Captain to grasp the control inputs made by the First Officer. Furthermore, it is
considered that the Captain felt that there was not sufficient time to inform the First
Officer of his intention to take over control of the aircraft. However, it is considered that
the Captain should have clearly assumed control by pressing the take-over push button
and by the “I have” and corresponding “You have” calls, even though it is considered that
simultaneous side stick in puts are not major factors in this accident.
(Refer to Figure 8-2.)
3.1.9 Approach and Landing Training and AOM Procedures
3.1.9.1 The Decision on Final Approach Speed
In this accident, the First Officer, acting as PF, calculated the final approach speed
using a simple method which differed from that specified by the AOM. It is considered that
the reason for his using the simple method was not only the fact that he had used it
previously based on experience, but also possibly because he feared that if the aircraft
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assumed a nose-down attitude if an approach were made at high CAS, a greater amount of
control input that normal would be required to flare the aircraft and this would make the
landing difficult. To the extent that these fears remained, he would not in actual operations
decide on the final approach speed for approaches in strong winds with large wind speed
changes in accordance with the AOM, resulting in the selection of a low final approach speed.
Operators should grasp the actual operational practices of pilots and, while considering
means of addressing concerns and fears of pilots, should adapt procedures and rules to be
suited for actual line operations and in addition, should thoroughly train pilots to follow
procedures.
3.1.9.2 Thrust Control in Conditions of Strong Wind with Large Wind Speed Variations
In this accident, the First Officer reduced thrust immediately after the CAS increased at
around 13:02:50. However, as described in section 2.12.9.2 (2), the AOM procedure for the
case where there is a possibility of encountering wind shear has a cautionary note that if
there is a sudden increase in airspeed thrust should not be greatly reduced as there is the
possibility that airspeed will subsequently drop. If the First Officer had heeded this under
the conditions of strong wind with large wind speed variations, it is considered that the he
would have reduced the thrust less than he did at the time of the accident.
It is considered that this description in the AOM is important for preventing recurrence
of accidents of this type and should be emphasized. Further, while AOM describes
procedures for the cases of possible and actual wind shear encounter, because the existence
of wind shear can be difficult to forecast, it is considered appropriate that these procedures
be considered normally applicable for approaches and landings in conditions of strong wind
with large wind speed variation. It is also necessary to thoroughly train crews regarding the
cautionary note.
3.1.9.3 Mode Selection for Approach and Landing
(1) Problems of “SELECTED SPEED” Mode for Approach and Landing
As described in section 2.12.6.1, the maximum final approach speed that should be set
in SELECTED SPEED mode is VREF + 20kt. In the case of this accident, the maximum
value is 132 + 20 = 152kt. However, if aircraft were actually operated at this high speed it
would always cause excessive lowering of the nose. This would affect “FLARE” mode, and
the amount of control input necessary to flare would be larger than for a nose-up pitch
attitude. As a result, is possible that it would be difficult to control the landing.
It is thus estimated that there are limits to carrying out a positive approach and
landing under manual control in “SELECTED SPEED” mode in conditions of strong wind
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with severe wind speed variations.
Regarding this matter, as described in section 2.12.8.3 the Airbus Industrie FCOM
states that in conditions of severe wind speed variation it is important to consider
carrying out the approach and landing with flap 3 instead of full flap.
(2) The Operating Procedures of Airbus Industrie and All Nippon Airways
As described in section 2.12.8.1 (2), the Airbus Industrie FCOM recommends the use of
“MANAGED SPEED” mode for ILS approaches.
On the other hand, All Nippon Airways’ AOM specifies that for approaches with
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