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flow had dropped to a value of approximately 5,000 lbs/hr corresponding to the thrust
lever positions that had been set two seconds earlier, and thereafter continued decreasing
gradually.
At around 13:02:52, while the aircraft was descending through around 141ft AGL, CAS
reached around 153kt even though the thrust levers had been retarded to reduce thrust.
It is thought that in order to reach the target airspeed of 143kt, the first officer continued
with the thrust levers retarded since airspeed was increasing even though he had
reduced thrust.
At around 13:02:53, while the aircraft was descending through around 136ft AGL, CAS
reached 149kt, dropping towards to the selected final approach speed of 143kt.
At around 13:02:54, while the aircraft was descending through around 126ft AGL, CAS
had dropped to 141kt, below the selected final approach speed of 143kt.
At around 13:02:55, while the aircraft was descending through around 114ft AGL, the
first officer, recognizing that CAS had reached 137kt and was remaining less than the
143kt selected target value, started to advance the thrust levers to slightly increase
airspeed. However, fuel flow continued to decrease due to engine response delay.
At around 13:02:56, as the aircraft was descending through around 99ft AGL, CAS
increased slightly to 141kt. Taking into account the time lag of the vertical speed
indicator, it is estimated that the aircraft descent rate began suddenly to increase at this
time.
At around 13:02:57, while the aircraft was descending through around 68ft AGL, CAS
suddenly dropped to around 122kt, and the Captain called “Airspeed” to alert the first
officer. Although the first officer further advanced the thrust levers, it is estimated that
fuel flow reached its minimum value at this time.
(3) From the Wind Shear Warning until just before the tail strike
At around 13:02:58, while the aircraft was descending through around 53ft AGL, the
synthetic warning sound of the reactive-type wind shear warning was annunciated. At
34
that time the PF called “Go Around”, and during the period from immediately afterwards
until around 13:03:00 he advanced the thrust levers to the maximum take-off thrust
position in accordance with the wind shear recovery procedure specified in the AOM.
Further, although the rate of descent satisfied the conditions for EGPWS warning
annunciation between 13:02:58 and 13:02:59, the EPGWS warning status during this
period is indicated as “NOT” in the recordings. It is considered possible that due to the
priorities of each warning system, the EGPWS warning was inhibited to allow the
reactive wind shear warning to sound.
At around 13:02:59, when the aircraft was descending through around 22ft AGL, the
recorded wind speed reached 14kt, and CAS dropped by around 36kt during a period of
seven seconds and reached its minimum value prior to the accident of around 117kt,
dropping towards the stall speed. The descent rate at that time is recorded as
approximately 1,220 ft/min. The first officer’s side stick was almost full back warded to
pitch up over the period from 13:03:00 to 13:02:59.
Moreover, the DFDR recording shows that the Captain also pulled back his side stick
at the same time as the first officer. It is thought that in the condition that the aircraft
was rapidly approaching the ground following a wind shear alert, the Captain acting as a
PNF did not have sufficient time to announce to the first officer his intention to take over
control of the aircraft and, without utilizing the take-over button on his side stick, also
acted to pitch up to recover from the wind shear. As a result of these control inputs, the
aircraft’s pitch attitude reached 15.5 at around 13:03:04.
Further, at the time of these pitch up actions, the aircraft’s α Floor Protection
function, which is designed that a pitch-up initiates advancing thrust levers to takeoff
position automatically without advancing it manually as described in 2.12.4.1 (2), is
thought to have not been operating because the flight crew started reactions against the
wind shear alert when the aircraft was below 100ft AGL.
At around 13:03:00, the descent rate of the aircraft was still approximately 1,220ft/min.
(4) From the Striking the Ground to the Climb
At around 13:03:01, when the aircraft’s recorded height was minus 4ft AGL and pitch
angle had reached 11.2 degrees, it is considered based on the 1.9G recorded vertical
acceleration and the sounds of impact recorded on the CVR that the lower part of the aft
fuselage of the aircraft struck the ground. The height value of minus 4ft is considered to
be the result of the fact that the shock absorbing system of the main landing gear struts
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