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increase just before wind-shear warning issued.
Further, as the same as in the accident, if it controlled to reduce the thrust by manual
in order to keep CAS increased in speed by the wind speed increase caused by wind-shear,
even if it establishes the final approach speed to 152kt as the maximum speed, because the
reduction of the wind speed by wind-shear suddenly happened while it is executing the
control to reduce the thrust, it was measured to the speed less than 144kt. Therefore, if it
executes the recovery control following to the wind-shear warning, it was impossible to
recover from the circumstances lately.
Even if it had been executed for the approach at strong head wind of around 50kt as set
the final approach speed to around 150kt, it was not measured continuously to minus while
the aircraft pitch attitude pitches down to around zero degree.
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2.12.10 Specification of the Seat for Passenger and for CA
In the airworthiness regulations applied at obtaining the type certification fro the
aircraft, even if the aircraft landed with small scale of failures in emergency landing
conditions, it is specified for the effect that the seats used by the passengers and by crews
shall design to preclude from the serious injury if it received the ultimate final inertial force
of 4.5G toward downward. For this, the seat for the passengers and for crews on the aircraft
is satisfactory with this regulation. However, there is no regulation to preclude the injury
relevant to the crews seated and the passengers except the emergency landing condition.
It was recorded for the maximum vertical acceleration of 1.9G.
The size of the seat for CA on the aircraft was measured the width of around 48cm, the
depth of around 41cm and the thickness for the cushion part of around 2.8cm and the
material was polyurethane, and the specific gravity was 0.099.
On the other hand, while the cushion for the passengers’ seats on the aircraft was the
same materials and the same specific gravity, the thickness was from 9.0 to 10.7cm. The
reclining angle of a CA seat was almost vertical with no armrest. (Refer Photo 6 and 7)
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3 ANALYSIS
3.1 Analysis
3.1.1 Airmen Certificates and Medical Certificates
The Captain and First Officer were certified with valid aircrew proficiency licenses and
had valid medical certificates.
3.1.2 Airworthiness Certification
The aircraft was certified with a valid certification of airworthiness, and scheduled
maintenance and inspections had been carried out.
3.1.3 Aviation Facilities
Aviation Facilities and Lights were operated normally.
3.1.4 Pilot Actions from the Final Approach to the Recovery after the Accident
Based on the DFDR data, CVR recordings, the statements of the flight crew, ATC
communications and others concerned, the pilot actions during the period from final
approach to the recovery maneuvers after the accident occurred are estimated to have been
as follows:
(1) Speed Establishment, Autopilot
The selected final approach speed under “SELECTED SPEED” mode was 143kt.
In this accident, the average value of CAS from a height of 1,000ft Above Ground Level
(AGL) to 177ft AGL was almost equal to the 145.0kt value selected for final approach,
and it is therefore considered that the first officer, acting as a PF, was flying the
approach with the aircraft in the prescribed approach configuration and at the selected
final approach speed.
Further, the PF disengaged the autopilot and autothrust by 500ft AGL, after which he
flew the approach manually.
(2) From 177ft AGL until just prior to the Wind Shear Warning
At around 13:02:47, before the accident had occurred, while the aircraft was descending
through around 177ft AGL, the first officer recognized a sudden drop in CAS from around
145kt to around 134kt, and the Captain, who was acting as a PNF, recognized a drop in
speed of greater than 5kt and called “Airspeed”. It is considered that in response to these
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events, the first officer increased engine thrust to increase airspeed.
At around 13:02:50, while the aircraft was descending through around 155ft AGL, the
first officer recognized that CAS had reached approximately 145kt, which exceeded the
selected target speed of 143kt in “SELECTED SPEED” mode, and judging that the
airspeed was tending to increase, began to close the thrust levers to reduce thrust in
order to maintain 143kt.
At around 13:02:51, while the aircraft was descending through around 149ft AGL, the
first officer recognized that CAS had reached 150kt and further retarded the thrust
levers to reduce airspeed. However at this time, because of engine response delay, fuel
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