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speed greater than 5 kts during the entire event.
2.2.8 It was subsequently found that the IRS units had been damaged during the
course of this event, as a result of high G loading. A defect in these units,
such as increased lag, would have the effect of displaying false wind speed
and direction information to the crew, especially during a phase of rapid
change, such as aircraft braking.
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2.3 Human Factors
2.3.1 The transfer of control from the F/0 to the PIC during the approach was
done without briefing either before or after the event. The absence of a
briefing following the change of control may have resulted in a lack of
clarity in the F/O’s understanding of his role. There was a notable absence
of some of the calls that would normally be made by the PNF, now the
F/O, after the change of control.
2.3.2 The subsequent exchanges, or lack of them, between the crew would
indicate that a good Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) environment
was not active in the cockpit during the approach.
2.3.3 Having taken control abruptly during the approach, there is a possibility
that the PIC would have been under personal pressure to successfully
complete the landing, rather than initiating a go-round when he was unable
to stabilise the approach. However, the PIC subsequently stated that this
was not the case.
2.3.4 As a result of the un-stabilised approach, the PIC found himself too high
on the glideslope at 1000 ft and initiated a high rate of descent, to avoid
overshooting. This caused an increase in speed, and resulted in him being
below the glide slope at 300 ft. In trying to land from this situation he
flared late, applied power, landed hard and bounced. During the bounce,
there was an input of nose down elevator, which was not the appropriate
action. This lead to a second, heavy, touchdown on the nose wheel, which
caused the damage to the aircraft’s nose structure.
2.4 Weather
2.4.1 The recordings of the anemometer, located close to the runway in use, gave
no indications of winds exceeding 5 kts for at least 6 minutes before or
after the event. The wind for 1 hour either side of the event did not exceed
10 kts. Furthermore, there are no indications of sudden changes of wind
directions. Preceding and subsequent aircraft did not pass any comments
on weather conditions to Shannon ATC.
2.4.2 The Shannon weather radar indicated the presence of a CB was located
about 6 km north of Runway 06 at 16.09. The indicated shower activity
was 3.7mm/hr, which is classified as light to moderate shower. This
shower could have generated light downdraughts and turbulence.
2.4.3 During the approach, the wind speed and direction recorded by the systems
on JY-AGK correspond well to the readings on the Shannon Anemometer,
with the wind speed gradually reducing with altitude and the absence of
any indication of gusts or abrupt or major changes in wind direction.
Throughout the entire event the Shannon Anemometer did not record any
significant changes of windspeed or direction.
15
2.4.4 The recording of a single incidence of a 055 change of wind direction
from 320 to 015 immediately prior to the initial touchdown was recorded
by the aircraft system in a period of rapidly changing parameters and
control inputs, and may well be erroneous. In this regard, it is significant
that no change of wind speed was recorded by the aircraft system
2.4.5 The Shannon Anemometer did not show any such change of wind direction
corresponding to that recorded by the aircraft system.
2.4.6 The possibility exists that such a brief change of wind direction may have
occurred as a result of the proximity of the nearby CB cell. But it should
be noted that the recorded change of direction, if it is correct, would have
moved the light wind from a cross-wind to a more head-on wind, thereby
easing, rather than aggravating, any handling difficulties.
2.4.7 Given that at the time of approach, the surface wind recorded by the
anemometer was 270 at 3 kts and at 2000 ft it was 330 at 30 kts the
resultant direction and velocity gradient was 60/27 kts. This is classified
as light wind shear. No material evidence indicating the presence of
stronger wind shear was found during the course of the investigation.
2.4.8 According to the data of the Shannon anemometer, there was a cross wind
of about 3 kts. A cross wind of this magnitude should not cause any
difficulties.
2.4.9 While the wind direction during this event was within the sector noted in
the airfield caution for turbulence and/or wind shear for Runway 24, this
aircraft landing on 06 would not have entered the area for potential
turbulence and /or wind shear until the end of its ground roll. Moreover the
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