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时间:2011-08-28 14:14来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:航空
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Section 415.33(b) requires an applicant to have a safety official possessing authority to examine launch safety operations and to monitor independently personnel compliance with safety policies and procedures. In order to keep safety concerns separate from mission goals, the person responsible for safety should have the ability to perform independently of those parts of the applicant's organization responsible for mission assurance, and should also have the authority to report directly to the licensee’s personnel in charge of licensed launches. The safety official should be identified by name, title or position, and by qualifications.
Orbital suggests that a safety official should not be required to report to someone who has a vested interest in the outcome of the launch. Orbital at 7. According to Orbital, such a person might be in a position to exert undue influence or pressure on the safety official. Id. When it proposed this requirement, the FAA intended just the opposite. The FAA intended that the safety official have authority to report directly to the person in charge of licensed launches in order to ensure that safety decisions were made at appropriately elevated levels, rather than becoming low priority issues buried in the lower levels of an organization. As noted in the NPRM, the FAA intends the reporting to ensure that the person responsible for the licensed launch ensure that all of a safety official’s concerns are addressed prior to launch. Accordingly, because both the safety official and the person responsible for licensed launch possess safety obligations, no conflict of interest should exist. The FAA also believes that this decision reflects a reality within industry, namely, that the person in charge of mission success may well make final decisions regarding safety. The regulations impose safety obligations on that individual as well.
Space Access also questioned this provision, querying the value of an applicant identifying the qualifications of a safety official’s position. Space Access believes that this could result in an applicant identifying the qualifications of the position even though the individual performing the job is not qualified. In order to clarify the FAA’s intent, section 415.33(b) now states that an applicant shall identify the safety official by name, title, and qualifications. An applicant must show that there is a relationship between the individual’s experience and responsibilities. The FAA agrees with Space Access that a safety official’s experience be provided. The FAA will not at this time impose requirements governing the particulars of a person’s education and years of experience. Instead, it will rely on the performance standard articulated in 415.33(b).
Although risk is inherent in the launch of a launch vehicle, section 415.35, which is promulgated through this rulemaking, establishes limits on how much risk the FAA will allow for a licensed launch. The FAA has clarified this section from that originally proposed in the NPRM to better describe the FAA’s expected casualty (Ec)
measure of risk by deleting "the probability of occurrence" and including mention of suborbital launch vehicles. The FAA is also classifying the scope of the hazards addressed. An Ec measure reflects risk from debris, not from
toxic releases or blast overpressure, which the federal launch ranges handle through other means. Additionally, the proposed term "collective risk" in the second sentence is now deleted to state more specifically that an applicant’s proposed launch shall not exceed an expected average number of 30 casualties in one million launches. This phrasing still describes collective risk, but with more precision. With these clarifying editorial changes, the FAA now adopts its measure of acceptable risk of Ec < 30 x 10-6 per launch.
The FAA received comments regarding its proposed risk threshold. Boeing supported the FAA’s proposal. Boeing at 1. Space Access argued that the Ec was insufficiently strict, and should be compared to involuntary rather than
 
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本文链接地址:Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations(29)