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时间:2010-09-29 17:04来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:admin
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line checks was consistent with his performance on base checks.
N-26
Interviews conducted by the HPG with instructors and other pilots at
SilkAir indicated that the captain’s ability as a pilot was above
average and that he was a competent operator. He was commonly
described as being very highly skilled in handling an aircraft and as
having fast reaction times. It was reported that he appeared to
maintain good situation awareness and that he made decisions
quickly, firmly, and confidently. He also appeared to be able to handle
any flight-related pressures quite calmly.
The captain was described by other SilkAir pilots as a good cockpit
manager. They indicated that he provided clear instructions, kept
first officers informed of his decisions, and let first officers make their
own decisions. He was quick to spot copilot mistakes or problems with
the flight. However, he was not known for criticizing copilots, and
liked to teach and show them new ways of doing things.
The HPG interviews of SilkAir pilots also revealed the captain to be
someone who operated “by the book” and who would not exceed
aircraft limitations. However, many pilots also indicated the captain
would vary from normal practices at times. For example, several
copilots reported the captain would often push the aircraft’s speed
beyond the economy speed of .74 mach.11 There were also several
reports of the captain performing higher than normal approaches12
and, unlike other company captains, exploring ways of varying
normal practices to reduce flight durations. Although the captain was
not generally regarded as an unsafe pilot, he was regarded as a pilot
who made his own decisions as to what was and was not safe.
Over a period of 2 years, the captain received several letters of
appreciation from the SilkAir B737 Fleet Manager for being on
standby. Such letters were standard for such events.
In addition, it is strongly suggested that the following events, which were
presented in the HPG report (version 6.0) be added to Appendix I:
24 August: The captain and the first officer who had been involved in
the go-around incident in March and the circuit
breaker incident in June flew together as a result of a
11 Economy speed is a speed that is supposed to optimize the relationship between time enroute and
fuel burn. It is a speed calculated to reduce the cost of operating the flight for the airline considering
several economic factors and not a manufacturer-imposed operating limitation on the aircraft.
12 A high approach means that during the descent from cruise, an airplane is at an altitude higher
than the typical altitude for a given distance from an airport.
N-27
roster change that the captain had requested for
personal reasons.
20 November: The captain was involved in an event that resulted in
an overweight landing. There was an engine power
problem noted during takeoff and climbout. After
discussion with an engineer on board, the flight crew
decided to return to Singapore instead of continuing to
the destination airport. The subsequent overweight
landing was not noted in the voyage report and
technical log as was specifically required by company
procedures. The crew also did not complete other
paperwork associated with the flight including
calculating the landing speeds, flight time, and fuel
flight plan. The B737 Fleet Manager noted the
discrepancies and sent both pilots letters the next day,
instructing them to "please be more mindful."
10 December: The captain was flying with close friends, one was the
first officer and the other was riding in the jump seat.
During the flight, the captain complained about the
B737 Fleet Manager and the letter he had received
about the overweight landing incident on November 20.
A variety of other topics were discussed (see
recommended additions to section “1.18.3.4 Recent
Behaviour”).
11 December: The captain visited the Flight Operations Manager to
discuss the letter about the overweight landing. The
captain was concerned that he had been sent a negative
letter about a minor issue and no mention had been
made about the significant good work he had done to
return the airplane to Singapore (according to the first
officer on that flight, the captain effectively managed
the increased workload that was associated with this
air-turn back to Singapore including troubleshooting,
making the necessary notifications to ensure that
passengers’ needs were met, and moving the airplane to
the maintenance area). The Flight Operations Manager
reported that he told the captain to send him a letter
 
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