曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
Boeing 737 Rudder System
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Appendix K
Boeing B737 Non-normal Procedures –
Emergency Descent
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Appendix L
Boeing B737 Alert Service Bulletin, Subject on Flight
Controls – Trailing Edge Flap and Horizontal
Stabilizer Trim
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Appendix M
Singapore Accredited Representative’s Comments on
Draft Final Report
Note: For ease of reference by readers, NTSC’s comments (in
courier) are printed onto the attached comments by the
Singapore Accredited Representative.
M-1
M-2
Attachment to MCIT/CA/MI185
dated 8 December 2000
M-3
COMMENTS ON DRAFT FINAL REPORT
1. For the benefit of most readers with little knowledge of aircraft accident
investigations, the aim and nature of the technical investigation should be explained
upfront in the final report and executive summary. For example, paragraph 3.1 of
Annex 13 states that the sole objective of the investigation of an accident shall be the
prevention of future accidents. Paragraph 5.4.1 of Annex 13 and ICAO Manual of
Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Part I – Organisation and Planning (Doc
9756) state that any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame or
liability should be separate from any investigation conducted under the provisions of
Annex 13.
2. The reason for informing the aviation security authorities should be explained in
the final report as well as in its executive summary to avoid any possible
misunderstanding by the public. It should explain that the NTSC had informed the
relevant aviation security authorities in 1999 based on paragraph 5.11 of Annex 131. As
such, there is a separate investigation conducted by the aviation security authorities, i.e.
the police. It should also explain that the final report of this technical investigation does
not go in depth into the pilots’ background as it is the subject of the separate
investigation by the aviation security authorities.
NTSC’S COMMENTS:
The aviation security authorities were notified
taking into account the findings of the Human
Performance & Factors Group in July 1999.
3. The Singapore Police has commented that two statements in the report relating
to the financial position of the pilot are inaccurate:
Page 25 paragraph 1.18.3.3
The statement “During 1990-1997 the PIC traded over 10 million shares, where
the value and the volume of the trading increased significantly every year”
should be corrected. The value and volume of the PIC’s share trading did not
increase every year but fluctuated during this period. Also, the two dates from
which the PIC’s trading activities were suspended should read as 9 April 1997
(not 15 April 1997) and 9 December 1997 (not 4 December 1997).
Page 43 para 2.14.3
The statement “The data available also showed that his loans and debts were
greater than his realizable assets” is incorrect. The pilot's realizable assets
were higher than his loans and debts.
1 Para 5.11 of Annex 13 states that “If, in the course of an investigation it becomes known, or it is
suspected that an act of unlawful interference was involved, the investigator-in-charge shall immediately
initiate action to ensure that the aviation security authorities of the State(s) concerned are informed.
Attachment to MCIT/CA/MI185
dated 8 December 2000
M-4
4. The Singapore Police also recommends that the report include mention of the
capital gains made by the pilot over the years through the sales of his houses. In
addition, it should also mention that the First Officer had another insurance bought in
1992.
NTSC’S COMMENTS:
The First Officer’s insurance policy bought in 1992
was not relevant to the accident.
5. We suggest that the fact that only a relatively small amount of wreckage was
recovered be reflected in the report. This will illustrate clearly the difficulties faced by
the investigation team and enable readers to better appreciate the NTSC’s tests (and
hence its findings) as well as its constraints due to the extent of damage to the wreckage
and the non-recovery of many critical parts of the aircraft. This would also give readers
an understanding of why comprehensive tests using the recovered wreckage could not
be conducted. As such, we propose the following:
Page 2 paragraph 1.3
There should be a more detailed description of the wreckage recovered. The
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NTSC Aircraft Accident Report SILKAIR FLIGHT MI 185 BOEING B(46)
